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ABSTRACr
This thesis examines the rationale behind the Brazilian Army's attempt to
establish effective control of the Amazon through the Calha Norte project. The
project was initiated in 1985 to satisfy geopolitical needs of Brazil. The thesis
argues that the rationale for Calha Norte has expanded to include not only
groulitical goals, but also a justification for the military's budget and
legitimacy. Furthermore, the expanded rationale has resulted in the Brazilian
Army enlarging its presence in the Amazon. Contrary to most of the literature,
the thesis argues that the Calha Norte project has a favorable impact in the
Amazon. The interests reviewed by the thesis include border conflicts, narco-
trafficking and environmental conservation. Finally, the thesis recommends
that Brazil expand the Calha Norte program, and that the United States support
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EXECUFIVE SUMMARY
"Calha Norte: Explaining Brazilian Army Presence in the Amazon"
LT Michael B. Ryan, USN
June 1993
The Calha Norte project is the Brazilian Army's attempt to establish
effective control of the Amazon. The project, unveiled in 1985, was originally
driven by geopolitical concerns to protect Brazilian borders and encourage
settlement of Brazilians in the region. Calha Norte involves primarily Brazilian
Army personnel establishing frontier outposts along the Brazilian Amazon
borders of Venezuela, Colombia, Guyana, Suriname, and French Guiana.
However, since 1985, the Brazilian political and military situations have
changed, which have caused the military to redefine the goals and objectives of
Calha Norte. This thesis argues that the rationale for the Army's
implementation of the Calha Norte project has expanded from the original
geopolitical motives to include justification for the military's budget and
restoration of the military institution's legitimacy.
The thesis is divided into three main parts. The first part reviews the
history of Brazilian involvement in the Amazon from 1500 to 1985. This part
develops the basis for the geopolitical rationale used to establish the Calha
Norte project.
Vii
The second part addresses the origins and evolution of the Calha Norte
project. Using case study methodology, the thesis compares and contrasts
Calha Norte in 1985 with Calha Norte in 1993. Within each case study the
thesis analyzes the independent variables of geopolitics, military budget, and
institutional legitimacy to explain the motivations for the Brazilian Army
involvement in the Amazon. The thesis further argues that as the motivation
for involvement in the Amazon expands, so too does the presence of the Army
within the region.
The third part of this thesis examines the international and regional
security concerns raised by the Calha Norte project and possible options for
U.S. policy regarding Calha Norte. Regionally, the paper analyzes the
possibility of heightened tensions between border countries as Brazil pursues
implementation of the project. The evidence indicates that the Calha Norte
project has actually improved relations between Brazil and most of its Amazon
neighbors. Internationally, the thesis analyzes the issues of narco-trafficking
and environmental degradation. The thesis concludes that the military aspects
of Calha Norte have had no impact on either of these issues, although one of
the project's goals was to counter narco-trafficking. Calha Norte does have the
ability to positively contribute to a Brazilian counterdrug campaign as well as
environmental preservation if its available resources are expanded and if
civilian agencies are further integrated into the project.
Vii
The United States cannot realistically expect to affect Calha Norte, as it is
a Brazilian domestic operation. However, given that U.S. security interests
(primarily counterdrug) are affected by the Calha Norte project, it is not
unreasonable for the U.S. to promulgate a policy that addresses the project.
The United States has esseuitially four policy options in relation to Caiha Norte:
1) opposition; 2) benign neglect; 3) support through indirect diplomacy and; 4)
support through direct diplomacy. These options are listed in increasing
magnitude of U.S. support for the Calha Norte project.
The thesis recommends that the U.S. adopt a policy that would facilitate
the expansion of the Calha Norte project. The policy which best accomplishes
this and minimizes friction between the United States and Brazil is the indirect
support option. This policy option advocates the U.S. to work through
international organizations, such as the OAS, to support the Calha Norte
project. By doing this, the United States sidesteps accusations of
"interventionism" in Brazilian affairs while still making progress towards
achieving U.S. objectives in the region.
ix
1. INTRODUCTION
A. TIlE QUESTION AND THE THESIS
The Amazon region of South America spans over seven million square
kilometers. While the majority of the region is located in present day Brazil, it
can be found in nearly every country on the continent: Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador,
Colombia, Venezuela, and Guyana. The Amazon's river and tributary system
are responsible for depositing over one fifth of the fresh water which enters in
the world's oceans.1 In conjunction with the river, the Amazon is home to the
world's largest tropical forest. Given that it did not pass through an ice age it
has remained virtually unchanged for over 100,000,000 years. The Amazon
region is responsible for the support of over one tenth of the known plant,
animal, and insect species on earth.
Since Pedro Alvares Cabral discovered Brazil in 1500, the Amazon has
been viewed by Brazil as a key to untold wealth and treasure. Thus, Brazilians
have jealously guarded the Amazon region from foreign influences as they
regard it as a means to achieve "grandeza".2 Attempts to conquer the region
'Sue Branford and Oriel Glock, The Last Frontier. Fighting over Land in the
Amazon London: Zed Books, 1985, 8.
2Grandeza is the term coined by Brazilians to describe the superpower status that
they believe Brazil is destined to attain. For a comprehensive discussion of this term
see Jack Child, Geopolitics of South America: Quarrels Among Neighbors New York:
Praeger, 1985.
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and extract this treasure have assumed both civilian and military forms,
ranging from tax incentives for civilian development to direct military
occupation of the frontier. The most recent attempt has been the Calha Norte
(Northern Corridor) project.
The Calha Norte project consists of both military and civilian
organizations which have established outposts along the northern borders in
the states of Amazonas and ParA. The official goals of the project are
geopolitical in nature in that they serve to demarcate the border, improve the
local infrastructure, and promote economic development of the region.
The purpose of the thesis is to examine the rationale of the Brazilian
Army in the Calha Norte project. Specifically, the paper proves that the
rationale behind the 1993 project has expanded from the rationale of 1985. The
paper further argues that this expanded rationale explains an increasing
military presence in the Amazon.
With the conclusion of the Cold War, both civilian and military planners
have searched for a new role for the Brazilian Armed Forces. Recent problems
associated with the Amazon such as drug trafficking, gold mining, and
environmental damage have caused the Brazilian Army to focus its attention
on this region as a potential new role and mission. Additionally, the Army
has been plagued by a shrinking budget due to Brazil's faltering economic performance.
My thesis argues that the rationale for Brazilian Army's involvement in
the Calha Norte project has expanded from the original geopolitical motives to
2
include justification for the military budget and restoration of the military
institution's legitimacy.
B. THESIS PURPOSE AND MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The thesis analyzes the motivations behind the Brazilian Army and its
expanding presence in the Amazon Basin. This analysis is important for the
security interests of Brazil and its neighbors. If one reviews the major conflicts
which have occurred within Latin America over the course of history, the
evidence would show that a large percentage of these conflicts resulted from
border disputes. Therefore, a buildup of Brazilian troops along a given border
could be interpreted as threatening Brazil's regional neighbors. A second
reason why this thesis is important relates to the interests of the United States
in Brazil. The United Sti.tes has specific regional concerns inside the Amazon,
which include: promotion of regional dcmocratization; increased efforts for
combatting narco-trafficking; strengthening of civilian institutions; and an
environmental concern for overdevelopment of the Amazon.3
As the United States progressively inserts itself into the role of
international peacekeeper, understanding the rationale of these buildups can
help it to mediate and resolve such disputes as they arise. The United States
must recognize that Brazil is a significant power within South America and the
3For details on sFeciflc United States concerns see National Security Strategy of
the United States The White House, January 1993.
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Third World. Consequently, Brazilian military motivations must be better
understood by the U.S. policy makers so that they might work with the Brazil
to realize U.S. regional goals and interests. This thesis provides an insight to
these motivations through analysis of the Brazilian Army's project, Calha
Norte. By focusing on the rationale for this program, the study uncovers the
present day concerns of the Brazilian Army and uses them to explain its
expanding roles and presence in the Amazon. The information is then used to
examine the implications for U.S. security interests and policy options.
C. METHODOLOGY AND ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS
The case study methodology is employed by this study. The single case
study of the Calha Norte project is analyzed over two periods in time: 1) Calha
Norte as originated in 1985, and 2) the Calha Norte project today in 1993. The
time periods were chosen to analyze the original rationale for the
implementation of the Calha Norte project and the rationale for the expansion
of the project. Within each case, the study will analyze the independent
variables of geopolitical influences, military budget, and institutional
legitimacy to prove the expanding rationale theory. Using this information,
the paper will then assess the effect of these variables on the dependent
variable of Army presence in the Amazon.
The thesis is divided into two distinct parts. The first provides a history
for the development of Brazilian geopolitical thinking and an overview of the
4
Calha Norte project. It presents an evolution of the project and analyzes the
findings in order to support the thesis of the project's changing rationale.
The second part examines the current regional situation and calculates the
impact of Brazil's expanding military presence ;n the Amazon. It examines
implications for U.S. security interests in the region with regard to U.S. stated
interests, and suggests U.S. actions, vis-a-vis Brazil, to secure these interests.
The conclusion provides a summary of the pertinent findings and makes
suggestions for further research.
II. HISTORICAL BRAZILIAN PRESENCE IN THE AMAZON
A. BRAZILIAN GEOPOLITICAL THINKING
The concept of geopolitical thinking originated in Germany with Friedrich
Ratzel (1844-1904). Ratzel suggested that the state had characteristics similar to
a living organism and that it should be studied from this perspective. His
framework of analysis posited that the state had to expand or die (to the
detriment or advantage of surrounding states). Additionally, he viewed
borders as "living frontiers" that were "dynamic and subject to change if the
stronger nations required expansion for their own existence.",4
Rudolf Kjellen (Swedish, 1864-1922) added to Ratzel's ideas by proposing
that certain geographical factors added or detracted from a given state's
power. To Kjellen, the international stage pitted nations against one another in
a competition for the world's limited space and resources.' Later, Sir Halford
Mackinder (British, 1861-1947) added to the literature by suggesting that land
transport was the key to control and power. He argued that a nation could
4See Jack Child, Geopolitics and Conflict in South America: Quarrels Among
Neighbors, New York: Praeger, 1985, 21.
'A more thorough presentation of Ratzel's and Kjellen's ideas are presented in
Howard T. Pittman, "Geopolitics of the ABC Countries: a Comparison," Ph.D.
dissertation, American University, 1981.
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overcome obstacles, or enhance advantages, posed by geography through
technology.6
Another German, Karl Haushofer (1869-1946), further developed the
geopolitical concepts of expansion, conquest, and genocide. General Pinochet
of Chile summarized Haushofer's concepts as follows:
"* "Lebensraum, or the vital space that a state must have to breathe, grow,
and expand.
"* The notion that a state's frontiers must be natural and should expand out
to the full extent of its Lebensraum.
" The concept of autarky, whereby the strong states develop their own
complete economic base, including the defense economy, so that they will
not be dependent on any other state.
" The idea that strong nation-states expand their spheres of influence out to
an optimum maximum, which then becomes the pan-region associated
with that state.' 7
These geopolitical concepts have been evident throughout the history of
Brazil's development as a nation. The expansion of Portugal into the western
regions of the Amazon (see below: A History of Brazil in the Amazon) were
'YThe technology that Mackinder was referring to was that of road building. For
a better overview and comprehensive discussion of geopolitics see James E. Dougherty
and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Contending Theories of International Relations
Philadelphia: J.B. Lippencott, 1971, 50-61.
7See Child, Geopolitics and Conflict in South America: Quarrels Among
Neighbors, p.2 2 . This summary was taken from Augusto Pinochet, Geopolitica
Santiago: Editorial Andr~s Bello, 1974, 60-61.
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illustrative of the strong influences of their geopolitical thinking. These values
were subsequently passed on to the Brazilians as evidenced by their actions.
Brazilian geopolitical thinkers, led by Army officer Mario Travassos,
differed from the German geopoliticians since they focused on concepts of
"integral security and development."' In 1935, Travassos wrote that this
needed to be accomplished by establishing "longitudinal Brazil". This concept
encouraged Brazil to expand from its traditional coastal population towards
the Amazon Heartland in order that Argentina's influence within the buffer
states and the River Plate Basin be minimized.' According to Travassos, the
establishment of this presence would give Brazil a much stronger base from
which to project its power.
A second geopolitician which influenced Brazil's geopolitical policy is
Everardo Backheuser. Backheuser promulgated the theory of "living frontiers,"
which posited that borders are fluid and flexible and respond to pressures
which are exerted by the nations on each side. Backheuser argued that a
strong nation would eventually expand into territories of weaker neighbors
and therefore Brazil should strive to occupy its "empty spaces".
The most powerf,'" proponent of Brazilian geopolitics in the latter half of
the 20' century was General Golbery do Couto e Silva. General Golbery was
"
8See Child, 35.
'The buffer states consist of Uruguay, Paraguay, and Bolivia.
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an official government advisor during most of the military regime (1964 to
1985). His writings and teachings were similar to that of Travassos and
Backheuser in that they espoused national integration and effective use of
national resources, effective occupation of internal territories, solidification of
border areas, and economic development as vehicles to obtain grandeza.
Brazilian geopoliticians believe that order and discipline are essential
ingredients for the nation to achieve international greatness.10 Furthermore,
national development greatly aids in the establishment of this order and
discipline. The consequences of this type of thinking has been the promotion
of several "themes" in Brazilian policy. The most prevalent theme, and the one
most applicable to this discussion, is the Brazilian push to occupy "the empty
spaces" of the Amazon basin.
The Brazilians view the Amazon as a place that houses untold mineral
wealth necessary for economic independence. Additionally, they see the
Amazon as a potential breeding ground for insurgencies since the
government's presence and influence in the region is weak and disjointed.
"'The concept of order in this case refers to both domestic and international
security. Domestic order addresses internal subversions which would act to sway
Brazil from its elite charted course towards grandeza. A good example of the concern
for internal subversion would be the 1964 coup. For a good general overview see
Gary W. Wynia, The Politics of Latin American Development. Third Edition,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990, 224-7. International order addresses
the political stability of Brazil's bordering neighbors. An illustrative example of this
can be found in the Suriname case study of Scott D. Tollefson, "Brazilian Arms
Transfers, Ballistic Missiles, and Foreign Policy- The Search for Autonomy," Ph.D.
dissertation, The Johns Hopkins University, 1991, 256-87.
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Therefore, given Brazil's strong commitment to geopolitical principles it is not
difficult to envision the aggressiveness with which Brazil has attempted to
conquer the "empty spaces" of the Amazon. The following chapters will better
highlight these geopolitical underpinnings of Brazilian policy and illustrate
how it has been and continues to be a primary motivational factor for Brazilian
presence in the Amazon.
B. HISTORY OF BRAZIL IN THE AMAZON
Prior to the Calha Norte project, Brazil's involvement in the Amazon
region spanned three different regime types: (1) The Monarchy 1621-1889; (2)
the Republic 1889-1964; and (3) the Military Regime 1964-1985. This section
will look at each of these three regimes as well as their reasons for exploitation
of the Amazon basin. Understanding the historical rationale and political
thoughts of the past regimes are vital to understanding the current motivations
of Brazil's Calha Norte project in settling the Amazon.
Each regime case study will focus on three separate factors: (1) political;
(2) economic; and (3) geopolitical. Events or policies within a given case study
will be classified as being political, economic, or geopolitical in nature.
Classifications will be assigned giving consideration to a policy's stated
purpose as well as the effect that it had on the region. For the purpose of this
discussion a policy or event will be considered to be political in nature if it is
intended to build political support or establish legitimacy for the regime in
10
question. It will be considered economic if the policy is intended to enhance
or expand the economic prosperity of the region. Finally, a policy will be
considered geopolitical if the policy is designed to maintain or expand the
country's power with respect to other regional countries.
1. The Monarchy, 1621-1889
a. Political Analysis
Given the nature of a monarchy and the definition of a political
event, none of the government's policies were evaluated to have political
overtones. Political benefit was neither sought nor gained during this time
period.
b. Economic Analysis
Similar to the political analysis, the Portuguese crown did not
use its policies to actively pursue an economic program to develop the
Amazon region. However, this is not to say that economics were not a
priority. Several policies during this time period clearly illustrate the desire of
Portugal to enhance the economic prosperity of the Amazon region.
From the moment the Europeans discovered the Amazon, it was
apparent that this region contained a plethora of natural wealth. It had been
likened by some to the situations in the Orient and in black Africa which had
already proved economically rewarding to many in Europe. The direct result
11
of this comparison caused the European settlers to flood the Amazon and stake
out their fortune in the forest.
The large influx of new settlers and the uniqueness of the
region, prompted King Philip IV to create the states of Maranhio and Grao-
Parn. They were to preside over the Amazon and deal directly with
Portugal.1" The settlers came to the Amazon with the intention of exploiting
the abundant raw materials. To prevent an irreparable "strip mining" of the
Amazon, the government responded by issuing explicit regulations that
controlled not only the exploitation of the forest, but also the river basin as
well."2
These regulations attempted to control the economic
development of the region in two ways. First it specified quantities and time
periods for extraction of the various Amazon natural resources. This is similar
to the way modern countries control the same processes today. It served to
allow for the extraction of the natural resources, yet prevented the
unrestrained plundering of the forests. Secondly, the legislation gave tax
incentives for the planting and replanting of certain vegetable wealth. This
helped to restore certain plants in the region which were endangered due to
"See Branford and Glock, 10.
12 For a comprehensive review of the specific economic policies of the monarchy
see Arthur Cesar Ferreira Reis, "Economic History of the Brazilian Amazon", in Man
in the Amazon ed. by Charles Wagley, Gainesville, Florida: University Presses of
Florida, 1974.
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the indiscriminate exploitation. The ultimate goal of the legislative package
was aimed at providing for economic development of the region while
preventing colossal damage to the forests from unrestrained plundering.13
Probably the most significant economic event which influenced
government intervention in the region was the "rubber cycle". This was the
period of time which followed Charles Goodyear's discovery of the
vulcanization process for rubber in 1840. A combination of the increased
demand for rubber and its relative abundance in the Amazon region created
an economic flurry which has yet to be repeated.
During the 1900's at the height of this boom, the Amazona's
state income alone was over US$18 million. Rubber production and sales were
responsible for over 82 percent of this income. To protect this economic
windfall, the government stepped in to regulate the industry. Laws were
passed making it illegal for foreign interests to own the production or
transportation aspects of the rubber industry. In essence, this legislation
reserved all the rubber profits for the Brazilians and therefore strongly
encouraged further settlement and exploration of the region by the nationals.
However, international pressures quickly mounted against these unfair trading
13See Reis, p.35. It should also be noted that in addition to providing incentives
in the region, Lisbon also provided incentives at home in Portugal to encourage the
Amazonian economy. This was accomplished by prohibiting the sale of non-ParA
items at home in the mother country. In effect they set up a monopoly for Amazonian
products in the Portuguese market.
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practices and the Portuguese crown was forced to rescind this legislation in
1857.1
c. Geopolitical Analysis
Throughout the reign of the monarchy, geopolitical concerns in
the Amazon were continually demonstrated. During this time period
numerous treaties were signed which revealed the importance of geopolitical
thinking to the regime. An excellent example of these treaties would be the
Treaty of Madrid (1750). This document has become a foundation for the
evolution of geopolitics in South America.
The Treaty of Torsedillas was agreed upon by Spain and
Portugal in 1494 and established the demarcation line illustrated in Figure 1.
However, immediately following the treaty's approval Portugal began to push
its settlements up the Amazon river basin. This was an attempt to occupy the
entire watershed.15 The Portuguese intent to occupy this land is best summed
up by Jodo the Fifth's decree: 'You shall not only defend the lands which my
vassals have discovered and occupied, but you will prevent the
"
4For a more in-depth discussion of the "rubber cycle" and its tremendous
economic effects on the region see E. Bradford Bums, A History of Brazil (2nd
edition), New York: Columbia University Press, 1980, 330-340.
15See p. 62 of Lewis A. Tambs, "Geopolitics of the Amazon", in Man in the
Amazon ed. by Charles Wagley, Gainesville, Florida: University of Florida Presses,
1973.
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Figure 1 Portuguese and Spanish Landholdings at the time of the Treaty of
Torsedillas. Source: Lewis Tambs, "Geopolitics of the Amazon," in Man in
the Amazon ed. by Charles Wagley, Gainesville Florida: University of
Florida Presses, 1974.
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Spanish from advancing into our areas: moreover, you will promote
discoveries and possess all that you can, if not occupied by the Spanish." 
16
In 1750, when Portuguese occupation greatly exceeded their
legal titles to land tracts, Lisbon pushed for the ratification of the Treaty of
Madrid. The concept set forth the idea that actual possession of the land takes
precedence over simply having the title to the land. Their success in coercing
Spain to sign this treaty served as a prelude towards their acquisition of nearly
the entire Amazon region in a similar manner.
Another indication of the importance of the regime's geopolitical
thinking was the establishment of the Forte d'Obidos. At d'Obidos, the
Amazon river narrows to a single channel approximately 1800 meters wide
near the Atlantic mouth of the river. Control of this section effectively
determined who controlled the access to and from the river. This fort provides
the best example of what happened throughout the region; Portugal utilized
stone and mortar to keep in check any Castillian challenge to land claims in
the Amazon"7 .
"'See p. 22 of Marcos Carieiro de Mendonca, "Instruc6es dadas pela rainha ao
governados da capitania de Mato Grosso Dom Antonio Rolim de Moura em 19 de
janeiro de 1749", A Amaz6nia na era pombalina, vol.1, Rio de Janeiro: Instituto
Hist6rico e GeogrAfico Brasileiro. Translation Tambs, 67.
17For a much more thorough discussion of the fort system established by the
Portuguese in the Amazon see Tambs, 63-6.
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d. Period Evaluation
Although economics shaped Brazilian policy towards the
Amazon during this period, it did not appear to be the dominant factor. The
enacted legislation was weak and provided little direction for the country with
regards to economic development of the region.18 Additionally, those policies
that incurred the criticism of the international community were changed
relatively quickly with little protest from Lisbon. This may have been
indicative of Portugal's commitment to fair trade practices, but more likely it
was attributable to the fact that economic development was not the overriding
concern of the regime.
On the other hand, geopolitical policy seemed to be taken much
more seriously. Events of the time indicate that Portugal's driving force was
to control and occupy the region. The extensive system of forts, unrestrained
westward expansion to possess "all you can", and the numerous battles fought
to claim, defend and reclaim territory all symbolize the monarchy's
commitment towards achieving their geopolitical goals.
2. The Republic 1889-1964
a. Political Analysis
Similar to the monarchy period, the government during the




politics cannot be considered to have driven the government's policies with
regards to development of the Amazon.
b. Economic Analysis
The major thrust of government involvement in the Amazon
during this period stemmed from the rubber cycle just as it did during the
monarchy. Monies from the rubber industry were used to transform Manaus
and Belem into two of Brazil's most modern and beautiful cities, rivaling any
contemporary European city."9 Manaus became the first city in Brazil to have
electric street lighting as well as numerous other amenities such as garbage
collection, telephone service and efficient waterworks.' These services were
instrumental in the governments effort towards encouraging Brazilians to settle
and economically develop the Amazon. This is best illustrated by the
population explosion of the Amazon at the turn of the century. In 1890 the
population of the region was 380,000. By 1910 the population had grown to
nearly 1,000,000. population explosion was experienced in the two cities of
Manaus and Belem. This was directly attributable to the economic
opportunities and quality of life that these two cities presented.
"Manaus and Bel~m served as the hub of rubber trade in the Amazon. These two
cities were located on the Amazon river on opposite ends and marked the beginning
and end of the rubber traders' route.
2For a more complete description of Manaus' and Belim's modernity see Bums,
335.
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Once rubber was found to grow outside a "natural jungle"
environment, rubber plantations spread throughout the Orient. This resulted
in the Amazon losing its monopolistic position in the international rubber
market. As the incentive to produce rubber in the region left, so too did the
population. The Brazilian government was not able to prevent the economic
and financial devastation which occurred in the region due to this exodus. An
opportunity to reinvigorate the region occurred during the Second World War.
To aid in resettling the region economically, Brazil negotiated the "Washington
Accords" with the United States. These agreements provided Brazil the
opportunity to supply the Allied war effort with rubber from the Amazon
region.
In order to prevent a repeat of the previous mistakes which
were made, Brazil set up several organizations to oversee and provide
incentives to encourage the responsible development of the jungle. First, the
government established the Banco da Borracha (Rubber Bank), which provided
the financing necessary for rubber collection. This bank still exists today, but
under a different name: Credit Bank of the Amazon Region. The expanded
name is also indicative of the expanded responsibilities it has to finance not
only rubber industries, but all industries in the region. Second was the
creation of the Serviqo Especial de Satide Phiblica (Special Public Health Service).
This organization was designed to assure health protection for the rubber
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gatherers, as their working conditions were less than ideal.21 This agency was
critical in the government's efforts towards enticing workers back into the
region. Lastly the government created the Superintendency of the Amazon
Valley (SPVEA). SPVEA was charged with overall coordination of
development of the Amazon as well as promotion of investment and
responsible use of the land's resources.
c. Geopolitical Analysis
Brazil's application of geopolitics in the Amazon was unaffected
by the regime transition to a republic. The first illustration of this were the
events which surrounded the 1903 Brazilian and Bolivian Treaty of Petr6polis.
In 1878, the state of Ceara experienced a drought that caused over 54,000
Brazilians to migrate to Amazonia looking for relief and employment. With
this expanded labor pool from which to draw, the rubber industry pushed
further into the Amazon basin. This push eventually led into Bolivia's Alto
Acre, looking for additional sources of rubber. Although Bolivia had few
resources in the Acre region, it attempted to exercise its sovereignty over the
area. The Brazilian government was quick to respond with military force to
protect the Brazilian inhabitants and eventually established the Independent
211t should be noted that the life of a rubber gatherer was unusually harsh and
tedious. It consisted of long hours for relatively low pay and extremely poor working
conditions. The majority of the rubber gatherers were peasants who could be
compared to the migrant farm workers commonly found in the United States.
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Republic of Acre in 1899. This territory was then officially annexed by Brazil
through the Treaty of Petr6polis four years later.
Probably the most blatant display of Amazonian geopolitics was
Kubitschek's construction of the new capital Brasilia in the state of Goias. Up
until this time, Brazil's population was concentrated along the ocean and the
riverbanks, which left the interior of the country essentially empty. Brasilia
represented the government's attempt to shift the nucleus of the country's
population inward.
To fully understand the geopolitical underpinnings of this move
towards the Amazon, one needs to recall the geopolitical history of Brazil as
well as events which were developing at the time. Historically, over one half
of Brazil's recognized territory was gained using the doctrine of uti possidetis de
facto (possession takes precedence over legal title). Allowing a large portion of
the Amazon frontier to remain unoccupied was analogous to providing an
invitation for the bordering countries to reclaim their previously lost lands or
possibly claim new ones. This Brazilian fear was certainly not unfounded as
Peru had begun construction on the "Marginal Forest Highway". This
expanded Peru's influence into the Andes Mountains and the Amazon region.
In order to prevent Peru and other countries from occupying and therefore
laying a legitimate claLi to the territory, Brazil forcibly moved its population
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inland.' Thus Brasilia, and all the construction associated with it, was to
provide the "launching pad for the conquest of Amazonia."'
d. Period Evaluation
Economics seemingly played a large part in formulating
Brazilian Amazon policy during this period. However, a critical review of
these policies indicates that they were not the primary motivator of
government intervention in the region. The policies that were intended to
promote economic development during the rubber cycle achieved very little in
that respect. They addressed the modernization and civilization problems of
the region (see the Manaus and Belim examples) as well as distribution of
profits, yet did nothing to address the efficiency of the rubber industry.
Consequently when rubber was discovered to grow outside the region, the
industry and the Amazon economy collapsed. The Rubber Defense Law of
1912 essentially encouraged the establishment of plantations (as in the Orient),
22The urgency with which Brazil viewed this problem is best illustrated by the
breakneck speed with which Brasilia was constructed. Begun in 1957, construction of
the city continued for twenty-four hours per day, seven days a week, and fifty-two
weeks a year. It was finally completed on April 21, 1960.
23This quote was taken from a speech given by a Brazilian official at the
inauguration of Brasilia. In addition to the construction of Brasilia, this project
consisted of over 11,000 miles of new roads connecting the new capital to the rest of
the country. ExercitIng the uti possidetis de facto doctrine, these roads extended past
Brazil's recognized borders into the Bolivian borderlands. See p. 137 Mauricio
Vaitsman, Brasilia e AmazOnia, Rio de Janeiro: S.P.V.E.A., 1959. Translated and
recorded by Tambs, 74.
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but by this time Brazil had already lost the rubber market.2 A government
which had been concerned with economic modernization would have initially,
instead of reactively, focused its policies on industrial efficacy and efficiency.
The insignificance of the regional economy on the government's
agenda was again illustrated with the institutions set up during the post World
War II era as noted above. These institutions were not only poorly funded,
but they lacked the ability to enforce any rules which they enacted. As
nothing was done to change this situation during the subsequent years, it
provides another example of the low priority of economics.
Unlike economics, geopolitics received a good deal of attention
and money with regards to the Amazon. The aggressive Brazilian occupation
and subsequent annexation of the Bolivian territory (Treaty of Petr6polis) yield
interesting insight as to the importance of geopolitics to the administration.
This treaty, combined with the regime's unprecedented determination to
complete the Brasilia project and occupy the Amazon frontier, leaves no doubt
that geopolitics again played a much more significant role than did economics.
3. The Military Regime 1964-1985
a. Political Analysis
The first truly political overtures that were made with regards
to developing the Amazon occurred in 1970 in response to a drought that
2See Burns, 339.
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struck the Northeast region of Brazil. The drought, together with the already
overcrowded living conditions of the Northeast, encouraged a situation that
was ripe for social and political revolution.' To avoid political chaos,
President MWdici unveiled his plan for a National Integration Program (PIN)
that would "open up the underpopulated Amazon Valley". The PIN was to
have three main objectives: (1) the opening and integration of the Amazon by a
new Transamazonian Highway; (2) the irrigation of 40,000 hectares in the
Northeast; and (3) the creation of export corridors in the Northeast.'
In addition to solving a social crisis and securing the political
situation in the Northeast, the PIN, more specifically the Highway, provided
great symbolic and political value to the Government. It was an object that
could be held before the Brazilian people as physical evidence that the
government was making positive progress towards improving the conditions
of the country. It procured the support of the important business constituency
by doling out profitable construction contracts. Finally and most importantly,
it diverted the nation's attention away from the oppression brought on by the
regime.
2'See Branford and Glock, 60. As the focus of this paper is the Amazon, an in-
depth discussion of the Northeastern situation is not presented here. For extensive
discussion of this situation see Thomas Skidmore, The Politics of Military Rule






The official government view of the Amazon during this period
was best expressed by then under-secretary of the interior ministry, Raymundo
Nonato de Castro's quote:
The government's aim is economic occupation of the [Amazon), not its
settlement. And this will be achieved through more technology and
capital than labor.'
In addition to being used for political purposes, the Transamazonia Highway
also served a stated purpose to aid in the economic maturation of the region.
According to its designers, it was an "attempt to transfer rural populations to
an environment and conditions propitious for their development into an
economically productive sector.'
The government's desire to economically settle the region also
resulted in the Amazon Development Plan. This plan was designed to
promote high rates of economic growth while building up the country's
productive forces. The government's expressed goal for the Amazon was for it
to become economically integrated into the economy as quickly as possible ii
order to take advantage of it's potential. The first attempt by the government
to accomplish this was to be coordinated through a SPVEA program. This
2See 0 Estado de Sio Paulo 10 November, 1974.
29See Wenceslau Dyminski Wozniewicz, "The Amazonian Highway System", in
Man in the Amazon ed. by Charles Wagley, Gainesville, Florida: University of Florida
Presses, 1973, 273.
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program offered tax incentives and rebates to businessmen and corporations
that were willing to set up and develop projects in the Amazon basin. This
program was successful in that the government was able to attract over 350
projects to the region, which resulted in nearly $1 billion dollars in tax rebates
over 10 years?"
A second program that the government used to economically
integrate the basin was similar to the first "rebate scheme". It was comparable
in that it offered federal monies for Amazon development, but it differed in
that it was modified to be more of an industrial policy rather than one of the
free market. This program, named Amazon Program of Farming
(Polamaz6nia), consisted of 15 poles that targeted various industries for
development.31 Polamaz6nia offered cheap land in return for the promise
that the owners would set up a specific "project" within five years of
purchasing the properties. The project resulted in the government investment
of nearly $300 million dollars over 3 years and the "settlement" of over
1,000,000 hectares of land.
"3°See Branford and Glock, 44.
31See Branford and Glock, 73 for a more specific description of the various poles
and their regional locations.
32The word "settlement" is used tenuously in that many of the corporations never
set up the projects as required by the Polamaz6nia and defrauded the government of




As with the other periods in Brazil, geopolitical maneuvering
within the Amazon was evident during the military regime as well. Just as the
Transamazon Highway served political and economic purposes, it also tried to
alleviate the fears within the military officer corps that Brazil was on the verge
of losing parts of the Amazon for want of settling it.33 Compounding these
fears was the discovery of extraordinary mineral wealth (specifically, iron ore),
and the previously mentioned Peruvian construction of the "Marginal Forest
Highway" that flanked the Eastern borders of the Amazon. The highway was
then intended to provide the aforementioned political and economic benefits
and establish the needed presence within the basin to prevent a uti possidetis de
facto takeover.
In addition to the Highway, the military government took other
steps to solidify its hold on the Amazon. These included the establishment of
frontier military colonies at Principe de Beira, Tabatinga, Cucui, and
Clevelandia do Norte; and the construction of Rodovia Perimetral Norte
(Northern Perimeter Rim Road) that essentially served to "fence in" the
Brazilian occupied territories of the Amazon.
Another move by the government that illustrated its geopolitical




Tocatins Region (GETAT) by the National Security ,ouncil. This body was
designed to oversee land distribution in the Amazon and was empowered "to
overcome the bureaucratic limitations imposed on [the previous civilian
organization] when it is dealing with land conflicts and issuing land titles."'
These bureaucratic limitations concerned the requirement of INCRA (a civilian
organization) to operate within the confines of the law. Unhindered by legal
issues, the government now redistributed land from the peasant farmers to the
wealthy businessmen and corporations. The redistribution was not for more
efficient economic development, rather these businesses would establish a
more militant and armed presence in the region in order to protect their
investments. This redistribution of land therefore strengthened the Brazilian
stronghold on the basin.
d. Period Analysis
This period saw the introduction of politics into Amazon policy
making. While politics played an important role with regards to
understanding a single facet of the Amazonian Highway, it can hardly be
considered to be the primary motivator of government involvement in the
Amazon.
Economics seemed to play an important role if one looks at the
money the government invested in the economic programs of the period. But
mSee Branford and Glock, 154.
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looking beyond simply the financial aspect, evaluation of the programs
administration would indicate otherwise. An example would be the initial
economic investment program that focused on tax rebates and credits in
exchange for private development of the Basin.
The agency in charge of the program was SPEVA and its charter
required it to ensure that each proposed project was economically feasible.
Additionally, after a project was approved, SPEVA was to verify that the
project progressed as proposed and that the tax credits it received were
reinvested in the region." It was rare that either of these events occurred,
which allowed for much of the government funds to be diverted to personal
consumption by the corporations. In fact numerous people were employed by
these corporations to assemble projects that looked good on paper, yet had no
long term chance of viability. Their sole purpose was to obtain the tax rebates
offered by the government.' Even more enlightening with regards to the
government's priorities were the remarks of one official that "corruption was
the price of development."'
The second development program was similar to the first in
structure as well as problems. First, it concentrated its finances on programs
that had no chance of succeeding even though the entrepreneurs may have




wanted to succeed. The best example of this was the cattle ranches that were
promoted by the government's Polamaz6nia. Cattle ranching was an
extremely inefficient operation because it cost more to grow the pasture grass
which fed the cattle than the ranchers were able to get for the beef itself.'
Second, it had similar problems in following up on the required progress of
ranches that received government monies. A research team from the interior
ministry found that almost two thirds of the ranches had not cleared and
developed the land required by their proposals. Of the ranches that were
operating, 90 percent of them were operating at 50 percent of capacity. Clearly
these projects did not command the government's close attention and therefore
cannot be considered to have been a priority at the time.
Geopolitics, as with the other periods of regime policymaking in
the Amazon, was the primary concern of the military regime. Execution of the
geopolitical initiatives was distinctly different from that of the economic
programs. Unlike the lackadaisical supervisory approach of the economic
enterprises, the geopolitical initiatives were recipients of close scrutiny from
the government. This detailed attention ensured a timely completion regardless
38There are many good discussions available con•erning the fragile ecosystem of
the Amazon and its infertile soil. One of the more interesting accounts can be found
by David Quammen, The Flight of the Iguana: A Sidelong View of Science and
Nature New York: Doubleday Press, 1988. This infertile soil makes it very expensive
to raise beef as the costs for defoliants (necessary for weeds) and fertilizers normally
exceed the prices obtained for the beef. For more on this discussion see Branford and
Glock, 77-83.
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of cost. It may even be argued that policies which were masqueraded as
economic were in actuality geopolitical initiatives to guarantee that a strong
presence was established and maintained in the Amazon. This could provide
a plausible explanation as to why the government was so unconcerned with
the progress of these enterprises.
4. Conclusions
Although economics and occasionally politics have been offered as
interpretations for the motivations behind the Brazilian efforts to occupy the
Amazon, these can provide only partial explanations of Brazil's push into
Amazonia. Regardless of regime type and economic situation, the geopolitical
explanation is the only explanation that comprehensively describes Brazil's
Amazon experience over the past 500 years. This suggests that geopolitics in
Brazil is not unique to a regime type, but rather it is a way of national
thinking, shared by Brazil's leaders.
The previous discussion attempted to separate economics from
geopolitics by way of a definition. This was done to highlight the point that
the profit aspect of economics was not a primary motivator for Brazil's policies
in the Amazon. However, it would be difficult to refute the point that
economics play a large part in determining a country's power on the
international stage. The best example of this would be the increasing
importance and influence that Japan exerts on international affairs. Recalling
that geopolitics was defined as enhancing a country's power with respect to its
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competitors, it stands to reason that economics could fit into the framework of
a geopolitical strategy.'
Several world events serve to highlight the importance of economics
and geopolitics. First is the events which occurred within the Soviet Union
during the 1980's through 1991. Previous policies that had emphasized the
military aspect of geopolitical strategies while neglecting the economic aspects
resulted in the eventual collapse of the state.
A second example illustrating the importance of economics and
power would be the power and influence enjoyed by Saudi Arabia and other
oil rich nations. With the exception of Iraq, the military component of these
nations are insignificant in comparison to other national armies, yet most of
them retain prominent positions in the world's political arena due to their
economic clout.
A final example is the growing political strength of the "newly
industrialized countries" (NICs) of the Pacific Rim. Their clout has
dramatically increased to the point that the South Korean government
intervened into domestic U.S. affairs and demanded restitution for Koreans
whose property was damaged during the 1992 Los Angeles riots.
If we expand our economic definition to include not only the
motives of profit but also the power associated with wealth, even more of
39See Daniel Papp, Contemporary International Relations: A Framework for
Understanding(3rd Edition), New York: McMillan Publishing Co., 1991, 399-430.
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Brazil's policies appear to support the geopolitical argument. This serves to
reinforce the importance of geopolitics to Brazil's strategy in the Amazon
regardless of regime type.
Understanding that geopolitical thinking has in the past been a
primary motivator of Brazilian policy is extremely important for predicting
and understanding future Brazilian policies and actions. The following section
will introduce the Calha Norte project and detail its motivations as it was
originally envisioned and then continue with looking at what motivates the
project today.
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II. THE CALHA NORTE PROJECT
A. CALHA NORTE 1985
1. Geographic Definition, Goals, and Project Structure
The Calha Norte project was established in 1985 as a joint venture
by the Brazilian armed forces and the Brazilian ministries of Health, Education,
Agrarian Reform, and Transportation to aid in the economic integration of the
Amazon Basin into Brazil. The project concentrates on three central areas --
the frontier zone, the river region and the hinterlands.'° Specific goals of the
project are to:
"* Increase bilateral relations with neighboring countries including trade;
"• Eliminate drug trafficking in the region;
"* Provide protection for the indigenous population;
"* Restore and reinforce boundary demarcation;
"* Promote regional development; and
"* Increase military presence and security in the area.4 1
'°See Susanna Hecht and Alexander Cockburn, The Fate of the Forest: Developers,
Destroyers, and Defenders of the Amazon New York: Verso Press, 1989, 119.
"'See "The Role of the Brazilian Air Force in Amazonia Security and
Development," USDAO document Brazil IR 6 809 00 58 89, enclosure (9), 15. See also
Hecht and Cockburn, 119, and "Calha Norte", Verde Oliva, no. 118, March 1987, 4.
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The project was designed to cover over 40 percent of the Brazilian
Amazon region, comprising a total of 14 percent of all Brazilian territory.
Specifically, Calha Norte encompasses a crooked corridor of land
approximately 250 km wide and 6,500 km long for a total land area of
1,200,000 Km2. The corridor is distributed within the states of Para, Amazonas,
and the territories of Amapa and Roraima. It's 6,500 km length travels the
borders shared by Colombia, Venezuela, Guiana, Suriname, and French
Guiana. 2 Figure 2 graphically depicts the geography of Calha Norte.
The project is physically located in the portion of the Amazon Forest
that had been previously undeveloped. Access to the project even today is
extremely limited by land vehicles as most roads are under construction or
otherwise unreliable. During the rainy season, the project can be reached by
river tributaries, but the majority of travel to and from the project is
accomplished by air transport. The native population of the region consists of
51 small and ethnically diverse Indian cultures. However, an increasing
number of migrants are drifting toward the region in search of gold and other
mineral wealth. As of 1989, 537 mining claims had been filed with the
Brazilian government, which represented nearly 20,000 goldminers.






Figure 2 Demarcation of the Calha Norte Project. Source: Lea Tarbutton,
'The Caiha Norte Project: Brazil's Armed Forces Modernization," Armies of
the World, January-June 1991.
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Historically, Brazil's armed forces have assumed the lead role with
regard to nation building, and the Calha Norte project is no exception. The
Army has assigned itself the mission of opening and securing the Amazon to
be accomplished by a successful occupation of the region. Although the other
services participate in Calha Norte, the Army provides the majority of support
for the project.
The project proposes to establish a Brazilian presence along the
border by creating eight outposts, manned by special frontier platoons. These
outposts, headed by the Comando Militar da Amazonia (Amazon Military
Command) located in Manaus, would serve the goals of border demarcation
and regulation, as well as encouraging development. Each post would consist
of approximately 70 soldiers, a food store, a school, a medical clinic, a
community center, a Fec, eral Police agency, a bank, an airport, and a system of
communications.43 The frontier posts are to serve as "city embryos," which
will provide the foundations for future community development in the
region."
The extreme conditions experienced by the members of the Calha
Norte project prompted the Army to create the Centro de Instruqao de Guerra na
43See Lea Tarbutton, "The Calha Norte Project- Brazil's Armed Forces
Modernization", Armies of the World (January - June 1991), 23.
"Ministerio do Exercito, Comando Militar da Amazonia, Seq:o de Planejamento.
Paper presented during the Fifth Doctrinal Meeting between Brazil and the United
States, Spring 1988, in Manaus, Brazil, translation Tarbutton.
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Selva (CIGS -- Jungle Warfare Training Center), in Manaus, which would help
individuals adapt to the jungle. The CIGS is to provide orientation seminars,
physical and technical training, and psychological preparation for all Calha
Norte personnel. To aid in this end, the project relies on recruiting from the
local population to ease the necessary adjustment to the Amazon environment.
Additional logistical support for this project is provided by the 8th
Military Region and the 12th Military Region, which are headquartered in
Belm and Manaus respectively. The 8th Military Command operates two
ocean-going vessels that are used to transport the heavy machinery and
equipment required for platoon operations in the Amazon. The 12th Military
Command provides tug and barge services as each frontier platoon is required
to maintain its own riverine transportation for administrative and logistical
support.45
The Brazilian Air Force and Navy also have interests in Calha
Nore, but their roles are primarily supportive and logistical in nature. The
Air Force has assumed the responsibility of building and maintaining the
posts' airports in addition to providing the majority of transportation to and
from the region. The Navy has been assigned the responsibility for security of
the waterways. Additionally, the Navy has procured two hospital ships to
4See Tarbutton, 23.
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render medical and dental services to the local Indians as well as the residents
of the frontier posts.'
2. Analysis of Calha Norte 1985
Calha Norte was not the Brazilian armed forces' first attempt to
extend their presence into the Amazon (see above: A History of Brazil in the
Amazon). Events and ideas that had previously influenced the decision-
making concerning this region continued to exert influence in 1985. This
section analyzes these influences on the Calha Norte project from the
perspectives of geopolitics, the military budget, and the legitimacy of the
military as an institution.
For this discussion, geopolitical influences will be expanded from
the previous definition to include My event that serves to affect the power
relationship between two or more countries. With regards to the military
budget category, an event will have significance if it influences the distribution
of financial resources to the Armed Services. Lastly, the category of
institutional legitimacy will analyze events that serve to affect either military
or public perception of the Armed Forces role as defender of the Brazilian
nation.




For Brazil, as well as many other countries, issues of geopolitics
have routinely been equated with issues associated with national security. The
Calha Norte project is no exception. National security of the Amazon region
was one the primary explanations offered justifying the 1985 project to the Jos6
Sarney Administration (1985-1990).7 Of primary concern to the Brazilian
strategists was infiltration of the Amazon by foreign forces, both governmental
and nongovernmental. These forces included communist ideologies in
Suriname, guerilla movements in Peru and Colombia, drug traffickers, and
illegal miners. Former President Sarney vocalized this perception when he
said: I know today that we are ready to defend our borders that
are threatened today by drug traffic and by destabilizing
movements that employ violence in neighboring countries;
to protect our national resources from greed; to care for the
huge empty spaces willed to us by our ancestor."
(1) Ideologies and Guerilla Movements. Understanding the
armed forces' sense of urgency related to implementing Calha Norte is best
explained by reviewing the major events that preceded the project's
announcement. To the Brazilian elite, the most pressing issues that threatened
the Amazon were the various destabilizing political situations surrounding
"See "Government to Implement 'Calha Norte' Project", Folha De Sao Paulo 31
October 1986, 6.
"See Josi Sarney, "Transi•-o 6 Feita Corn as Forqas Armadas", 0 Estado de Sio
Paulo 18 December 1987.
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Brazil during the early 1980's in Suriname, Colombia, and Peru. The
instability in Suriname resulted from Cuban guerrillas sent by Castro to shore
up the Bouterse regime. Lieutenant Colonel Desire Bouterse came to power
during a February 1980 coup against a freely-elected Surinamese government.
Bouterse was responsible for installing leftist dictatorship, which established
closer ties to the Soviet Union and Cuba. Like the Soviet Union and Cuba,
Bouterse was highly intolerant of political opposition, which led him to order
the execution of 15 prominent opposition leaders in 1982." The direct result
of these executions was the suspension of Western trade and economic aid,
leaving Suriname in a very difficult economic condition.
As Bouterse had strengthened ties to Cuba following his
assumption of power, Cuba was quick to fill this void left by the Wpstern
nations. By the end of 1982, Cuba was supplying Suriname with between 30
and 100 "advisors" as well as training for Surinamese commandos and
presidential bodyguards.'
The Brazilian military regime had assumed power to fend
off communist advances inside Brazil. It was not surprising then that they
"See Celestine Bohlen, "OAS Criticizes Suriname Over Human Rights,"
Washington Post 13 October 1983.
"
5 For a more in depth discussion of the Surinamese situation and the resultant
Brazilian response see Scott D. Tollefson, "Brazilian Arms Transfers, Ballistic Missiles,
and Foreign Policy- The Search for Autonomy," Ph.D. dissertation, The Johns Hopkins
University, 1991.
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perceived Cuba's expanding influence in Suriname as a threat to their own
political stability.51 The Brazilian response took on two facets to combat the
situation in Suriname. The first facet was "offensive" in nature in that Brazil
sent a delegation to Suriname to offer Brazilian forces and resources to replace
those that Cuba had sent. The implication was that if this offer was refused,
military action against Suriname would result.5 2
The second facet of the response was "defensive" in nature,
in that Brazil took measures to strengthen their borders against the infiltration
of Marxist ideology. The Surinamese situation was probably the single biggest
catalyst for the Calha Norte project as it spurred the army to invest US$80
million for the border strengthening. This argument was used to provide the
foundation for the military's rationale to institute the Calha Norte project. The
feeling within the military was that such an ideological infiltration into Brazil
was a direct assault on the nation's sovereignty.5 3 The situations in Peru and
Colombia presented a similar affront to Brazilian sovereignty. In Peru, the
Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) represented a serious threat not only to the
"
51See "Army Concerned over Cubans In Suriname," Folha de Sio Paulo in
Portuguese, 3 April 1983, 9, translated by FBIS 7 April 1983. See also "Army to Army
Relationships: Past-Present-Future", Brazilian Military brief presented to the U.S.
Army Policy Council, 6 May 1986, by Colonel Sam A. Gray, U.S. Army Attache Brazil.
SZSee Tollefson, 264-267.
"S3U.S. Government Official, interview by author, Washington D.C., March 31 1993.
See also 'Northern Borders Being Strengthened: Army Concerned over Spread of
Marxist Influence," Latin America Regional Reports: Brazil RB-87-01, 1 January 1986,
3.
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Peruvian government, but also to Brazil. The Shining Path, a Maoist and
Marxist revolutionary movement within Peru, is committed to overthrowing
the current government through violent insurrection. Its goal, consistent with
Maoist tenets, is to mobilize the rural peasant masses alongside the urban
shantytown dwellers to rise up against the central government. Using the
"proletariat" masses located outside the cities, Sendero's leadership is
attempting to squeeze the cities and government into submission.•
The movement primarily operates in the Andean highlands
and focuses on being the first "continuing and positive outside contact for
many peasants."55 David Scott Palmer, an expert on the Shining Path, has
noted, "the greatest contact between the peasantry and Sendero tended to be
those of least contact between the peasantry and the government." Examples
of regions where the government maintains minimal involvement and
subsequently where Sendero flourishes, are reported in the 1981 Ayacucho
department census. For a population of 500,000 people, Ayacucho boasted 30
doctors, 366 hospital beds, 827 telephones, and 44 kilometers of paved road.'
'See Gordon H. McCormick, "From the Sierra to the Cities: The Urban Campaign
of the Shining Path," RAND, R-4150-USDP, 1992, 7. For a more detailed discussion
of the tactics and ideologies of the Shining Path see also David Scott Palmer, editor,
The Shining Path of Peru New York. St. Martin's Press, 1992, and Gordon H.
McCormick, "The Shining Path and the Future of Peru," RAND, R-3781-DOS/OSD,
March 1990.
"S5 ee David Scott Palmer, "Rebellion in Rural Peru: The Origins and Evolutions




This information was instrumental in the formulation and
defense of the Calha Norte project.5 7 The Brazilian military feared that
clashes between Peruvian federal troops and the Sendero Luminoso could
cause the revolutionaries to seek a safe haven inside an uncontrolled Brazilian
Amazon.' If Sendero were to establish strongholds in the Amazon, not only
would it be an affront to Brazil's sovereignty in the region, but it could lead to
the expansion of the movement into the Brazilian political arena.
The Calha Norte project was designed not only to establish
the military presence in the region, which would deter the Shining Path from
settling in Brazil, but also at taking away potential bases of support. Peru's
approach to eradicating Sendero had been an exclusively military approach,
which by most evaluations had failed. Even the recent capture of leader
Guzman has not deterred the group from continuing with their strategy of
mobilizing peasant masses. Brazil's Calha Norte project differed from the
Peruvian approach in that it did not use the military to keep the guerilla
movement in check, rather it provided positive and continuing government
contact with the local residents. The latter part was accomplished by the
"57See "Army to Army Relationships: Past-Present-Future," brief presented to the
U.S. Army Policy Council, 6 May 1986, by Colonel Sam A. Gray, USA Attache, Brazil.
5
'See Andrew Hurrell, "The Politics of Amazonian Deforestation," The lournal of
Latin American Studies, volume 23, February 1991, 206.
44
frontier post schools, hospitals, and dental clinics that made up the frontier
post community."
In addition to the Shining Path in Peru, the M-19
organization in Colombia also provided the stimulus for the Calha Norte
project. The M-19 is a faction of the Colombian guerilla group FARC. Like
the FARC, the M-19 is dedicated to the overthrow of the Colombian
government using violent means as necessary. Although this organization
does not share the ideological tenets of the Shining Path, they are still a source
of instability along the Brazilian Amazon Border.'
In 1985, the M-19 concerned the Brazilian military for two
reasons: illegal mining operations in the Amazon as well as the unauthorized
use of Brazilian territories to establish bases of operations. A 1985 newspaper
report indicated that the M-19 had set up camps along the Negro River in the
Amazon near the Mapapi and Panapana gold fields.61 These reports
indicated that the M-19 was using the Brazilian Amazon as a safe haven to
evade the Colombian authorities. Furthermore, they were using the local
"Calha Norte. Brazilian Military pamphlet, 1987, 3. This pamphlet identifies
specific goals of improving the social services and infrastructure available to the
Brazilian Indians.
60"Army Carries Out Maneuvers Near Colombian Border," Folha de Slo Paulo in
Portuguese, 11 December 1985, 1, translated in FBIS, volume VI, 13 December 1985,
D5.
"61"Army Investigating M-19 Border Operations," 0 Estado de S.o Paulo in
Portuguese, 21 December 1985, 5, translated in FBIS, volume VI, 26 December 1985,
D4.
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Indian population to search for gold as a means of financing their guerilla
activities inside Colombia.
(2) Drug Trafficking. The increased amount of drug trafficking
in the Amazon region has provided additional impetus for the implementation
of the Calha Norte project. A report released in 1991 indicated that 60% of the
cocaine arriving in Europe passed through Brazil.'2 The increased attention
that smugglers and producers have been receiving from the governments of
Peru and Colombia have resulted in a large number of these organizations
relocating to the Brazilian Amazon, where there has been little government
presence.' 3 Furthermore, Brazil is a major producer of coca-manufacturing
chemicals such as ether, acetone and benzine. Brazil will only sell these
chemicals to legitimate businesses. Therefore, traffickers have found it
beneficial to locate their labs in Brazil where they can avoid the scrutinization
of Brazilian customs. This makes it much easier to acquire these chemicals.
By 1988, Brazil was noted to be a major player in the international narcotics
62Don Bohnin& "Suriname Emerges as Shipping Point for Europe's Drugs," Miami
Herald 23 June 1991, 15A. See also "Police Uncover 'New' Medellin Cartel Drug
Route," Brasilia Radio Nacional de Amazonia in Portuguese, 29 November 1989,
translated in FBIS, 30 November 1989, 44-45.
63Jesus E. Brando, "Narcotrafico tomo como base el Caribe: Oriente se ha
convertido en puente de sangre y coca [Drug Trafficking Took C.'Ibbean as Base: The
East has Become a Bridge of Blood and Cocaine]," Nacional in Spanish, 23 July 1991,
translated in InfoSouth, accession no. 49708.
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chain, participating in all facets of the trade." Brazilian Army officials and
other strategists have indicated they view drug trafficking to be a major issue
of national security with a potential of transforming the Amazon into another
Vietnam.65
The Calha Norte project provided the Brazilian military
response to this increased trafficking." Normally the drug operations were
tracked and prosecuted by the Brazilian Federal Police (PF) given that the
Army is prevented by the Brazilian Constitution from participating in law
enforcement activities. Consequently, the project was not designed to
apprehend illegal traffickers, it merely deterred them from crossing the border
and establishing a presence in the Amazon.' In fact, the 5th Special Frontier
Battalion was set up and specifically located in S~o Gabriel da Cachoeira with
"Alan Riding, "Brazil Now a Vital Crossroad for Latin Cocaine Traffickers," The
New York Times 28 August 1988, section 1.1.
"Anonymous, "Na Amazonia, o desaflo [In the Amazon, the Challenge]," Estado
de Sao Paulo, in Portuguese, 7 September 1989, translated by InfoSouth accession no.
19194. The author of this article expressed fears that an increasing drug economy in
the Amazon would lead to unwanted international attention, specifically from the
United States. Brazil feared that as the Amazon became a major production and
transhipment route for cocaine, US advisors would be forced upon them, creating a
situation similar to Vietnam.
"Andrew Hurrell, "The Politics of Amazonian Deforestation," The Journal of Latin
American Studies volume 23, February 1991, 206.
67
"Military to Strengthen Border Against Traffickers," Madrid EFE, in Spanish, 30
March 1967, translated in FBIS, 2 April 1987, D2. See also "Army Ministry
Investments in 1987 Modernization Surveyed," Folha de Slo Paulo in Portuguese, 10
January 1988, translated in IPRS, LAM-88-009, 3 March 1988, 10-11.
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Battalion was set up and specifically located in Sdo Gabriel da Cachoeira with
this mission in mind. These daily operations of the frontier posts confirm this
design, in that frontier soldiers do not actively search for drug trafficking
operations. If operations are encountered, the traffickers are apprehended and
turned over to the PF members stationed at the frontier posts, who in turn
prosecute the perpetrators.'
(3) Wildcat (illegal) Mining Operations. Lastly, support for the
Calha Norte project was boosted in 1985 by the illegal mining of Amazonian
gold and mineral wealth." The military viewed the Amazon's illegal mine
operations as the stealing of national assets. A study performed by the
National Department of Mineral Production (DNPM) estimates that between
1977 and 1986, 1,569 tons of gold were lost due to smuggling operations,
compared to the 167 tons that were recovered through legitimate mining
methods. Brazil estimated these losses to have cost them US$22.6 billion,
which was equivalent to nearly 20 percent of the external national debt. 70
Based on the results of this study, the DNPM called for greater government
"
8U.S. government official, interview by author, Quantico, VA, 30 April 1993.
"
9A study performed by the Hudson Institute demonstrated that there are US$1.7
trillion worth of mineral reserves in the Amazon region. See "Amazon Commander
Scores Industrialized Nations," 0 Globo in Portuguese, 19 July 1991, 7, translated and
reported in F LAT-91-141, 23 July 1991, 18.
70
"Revenue Losses From Wildcat Gold Prospecting Assessed," Correiro Braziliense,
in Portuguese, 14 February 1988, translated in IPRS LAM-88-015, 15 April 1988, 19-20.
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the regions containing prospecting operations to stem the massive outflow of
capitol.71
In addition to the financial losses incurred as a result of
the prospecting, Brazilian military officials also viewed the problem as a loss of
sovereignty issue. This was because the borders were frequently transversed
illegally by Colombian and Venezuelan nationals to work in these wildcat
mines. Similar to the drug trafficking issue, the military wanted to establish a
presence in the Amazon that would deter further exploitation of these national
resources as well as strengthen the borders.7'
b. Budgetary Influences
Funding and other financial concerns played small
inconsequential parts with regards to the rationale of the Calha Norte project.
This was clearly evident from the funding the military received as well as ease
which they obtained these resources. Although the military had just recently
retired from power in 1985, they were far from powerless with regards to
influencing civilian administrative policies. In fact, prior to retiring, the Army
generals skillfully maneuvered themselves into political positions within the
"7Ibid, 20.
72"Army Ministry Investments in 1987 Modernization Surveyed," Folha de Sio
Paulo in Portuguese, 10 January 1988, translated in IPRS LAM-88-009, 3 March 1988,
10-11.
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government so as to be able to control and reinforce corporate military
goals.'7 One of the more illustrative examples of this was the control they
exerted over the National Service for Intelligence (SNI) and its successor
agencies. Their control of the national intelligence and information network
allowed them to exert significant influence in all aspects of the new
administration.
Examples of this influence can be found with the initial and
subsequent funding of the Calha Norte project. Even though Brazil was
experiencing an economic crisis in 1986, the Army still received generous
authorizations for its programs. With little hesitation, Congress appropriated
in 1985 an initial US$180 million and US$250 million for each subsequent year,
to support of the Foroa Terreste 90 (FT-90), the armed forces' modernization
program that included the Calha Norte project.'4 More interesting than the
appropriation is the fact that the government had little idea as to where it
would obtain the monies to fund this program. Some reports indicated that
"Daniel Zirker, "The Civil-Military Mediators in Post-1985 Brazil," Journal of
Political and Military Sociology, vol. 19, 1991, 48-49. See also Ken Conca,
"Technology, The Military, and Democracy in Brazil," Journal of Interamerican
Studies and World Affairs Spring 1992, 150-1.
74"Army Modernization is Under Way," Latin America Regional Reports: Brazil
RB-86-03, 14 March 1986, 5. See also "Armed Forces to Get US$250m a Year.
Modernization of Weaponry and Communications Systems," Latin American Regional
Reports: Brazil RB-86-07, 14 August 1986, 5.
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the money was to be transferred from the budgets of other agencies, such as
the ministries of communications, health, and interior.7"
At the conclusion of 1987, the Army had used up its allotted
appropriations for the FT-90 project. In order to continue with the project, the
Army lobbied Congress and successfully gained the authorization for an
additional Cz$4.7 billion (approximately US$350 million at the time). This new
amount alone was equivalent to 1.2 percent of the government deficit forecast
for 1987.76 The influence and power that the military enjoyed during this
period enabled them to forward this request to the Congress with little
justification for its spending. In fact, not only did the Army continue to ask
for more money, but a statement by the armed forces constitutional
commission additionally proposed that "no [monetary] limits should be
established in the defense budgets."' Much of this autonomy the military
had with regard to its budget stemmed from the perception within Brazil that
the financial investment in the military would lead to a higher
"professionalization". This increased professionalization would inhibit the
armed forces from political interventions, as in the coup of 1964.'
NSbid, 5.
76
"Purchases, Costs of Army FI-90 Modernization Project Viewed," 0 Estado de
Sio Paulo, in Portuguese, 18 September 1987, 18, translated by IPRS.
'"Military Wants Emergency Measures in Constitution," 0 Globo in Portuguese,




c. Institutional Legitimacy Influences
The 1964 Brazilian Army enjoyed a degree of institutional
legitimacy from the general populace. This was most evident during the
military's 1964 coup of the JoAo Goulart government, when President Goulart's
request for Brazilians to "rush the barricades" in protest of the coup was
answered with a loud silence." In fact, not only did the coup go unprotested
by most Brazilians, but it was cheered and regarded as the "greatest day in
(Brazilian] history."'I
In 1985, even though the military government had stepped
down due to being discredited with 21 years of political rule, the military as
institution retained substantial legitimacy. Therefore, just as budgetary politics
had little to no influence concerning the rationale for Calha Norte, the same
was true for questions of institutional legitimacy or the raison d'etre for the
military and its function.
During the period between 1985 and 1987, the military had
successfully defended, and the public accepted, their role and mission within
Brazilian society as guarantor of the national security both externally and
internally. Efforts by civilian officials to restrict the military institution with
"
79Burns, 502-3.
"°Octavio lanni, Crisis in Brazil translated by Phyllis B. Eveleth, New York:
Columbia University Press, 1970, 128.
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regards to Constitutional responsibilities failed, as did their efforts to combine
the services under a unified Ministry of Defense."'
Following the resignation from power by the Armed forces in
1985, a movement was initiated to scale down the institutional military's
responsibilities within Brazilian society. A draft constitution approved in 1986
by the Constitutional Studies Provisional Commission, articulated the Armed
Forces' responsibility to include only external defense of the country.' The
immediate response from the military was a reiteration of their historical
constitutional mission of both internal and external defense. Army Minister
General Leonidas Pires Goncalves was quoted as saying "[internal defense] is
our constitutional mission, and we will not give it up now or in the future."'
Meetings held by the Army's officials to discuss the new constitutional draft
did not even include debate over the proposed new role for the armed forces
institution, because they did not consider reduced responsibilities a legitimate
option. The position by the Army, retaining both external and internal defense
81Ken Conca, "Technology, The Military, and Democracy in Brazil," Journal of
Interamerican Studies and World Affairs Spring 1992, 150-1.
'"Military Ministers Reject Reductions of Duties," 0 Estado de Sao Paulo in
Portuguese, 10 June 1986, 1, translated in FBIS, volume VI, 17 June 1986, D2.
"•"Armed Forces Concerned Over New Military Role," 0 Estado de Sao Paulo, in
Portuguese, 7 June 1986, 4, translated in FBIS, volume VI, 13 June 1986, D1.
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responsibilities for the armed forces, was eventually upheld in the 1988
constitution."
In addition to the responsibilities issue, a second debate was
held to attempt to unite the three services under one ministry of defense,
thereby reducing the powers of each of the individual service institutions.
This effort was also derailed by the armed forces.85
B. CALHA NORTE 1993
1. Geographic Definition, Goals, and Project Structure
The geographical definition of the Calha Norte project has not
changed in its scope in that it still focuses on an area of land approximately
1,200,000 km' encompassing the frontier lands, the river regions, and the
hinterlands of the Amazon. What has changed, however, has been the
structure of the project as well as the stated goals of the project. While
command structure has remained the same the number of posts has increased
from eight to nineteen.* These posts fall under the five Special Frontier
Battalions as follows:
"U"Armed Forces Role," Folha de Sao Paulo in Portuguese, 27 August 1988, A-5,
translated in FBIS, LAT-88-167, 29 August 1988, 37.
$5 Conca, 148.
ft"Implementation of Calha Norte Project Urged," Correiro Braziliense in
Portuguese, 16 November 1990, 5, translated in FBIS, LAT-91-006, 9 January 1991, 24.
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"* First Special Frontier Battalion headquartered in Tabatinga with Special
Frontier Platoons in Vila Bittencourt and Ipiranga.
"* Second Special Frontier Battalion headquartered in Boa Vista with Special
Frontier Platoons in Surucucu, Auaris, Erico, BV-8, Normandia, and
Bonfim.
"* Third Special Frontier Battalion headquartered in Macapa, with Special
Frontier Platoons in Oiapoque and Tirios.
"* Fourth Special Frontier Battalion headquartered in Rio Branco.
"* Fifth Special Frontier Battalion headquartered in S&o Gabriel da Cachoeira
with Special Frontier Platoons in Iauarete, Querari, Sio Joaquim,
Maturaca, and Cucui.
In addition to the increased posts, additional support battalions
have moved or are planned to move into the Amazon region in support of the
Calha Norte project. Specifically, the 17' Motorized Infantry Battalion is to be
transferred from Cruz Alta to become the 17' Jungle Infantry Battalion. The
61 "t Motorized Infantry Battalion in Santo Angelo will be restationed as the
61"t Jungle Infantry Battalion. Lastly the 16th Engineering and Construction
Battalion at Cruzeiro do Sul will be relocated to Rio Branco. Furthermore, the
Army outlined plans to open two additional garrisons at Tunui and Asun(ao
do Icana in the Rio Negro region, known as Dog Head.'
Furthermore, the goals have changed slightly from the original six
goals published in 1986 (see Calha Norte 1985: Geographic Definition, Goals,
and Structure above). All the stated goals remained the same, with the
17"Calha Norte Project Given Higher Priority," ]ornal do Brasil in Portuguese, 2
November 1992, 4, translated in FBIS, LAT-92-243, 17 December 1992, 26-7.
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exception of the drug trafficking mission, which was replaced by a
commitment to improve social services.' While improved social services had
been a consequence of the Army's occupation of the Amazon, it had not
previously been a stated goal.
2. Analysis of Calha Norte 1993
This section will analyze the Calha Norte project using the same
independent variables of 1985 section: geopolitics, military budget, and
institutional legitimacy. The definitions for each of these variables will be
identical to the ones used in the 1985 section.
a. Geopolitical Influences
Similar to the rationale involved with the Calha Norte project in
1985, geopolitics still has great influence with regard to the Army's desire to
occupy the Amazon. The same factors that shape the geopolitical agenda in
1993 have changed slightly, but for the most part are the same as they were in
1985. Regional guerrilla operations, drug trafficking, and wildcat mining
operations have worked together to make the implementation of Calha Norte
of premier importance to the Army.
"Boletim Informativo, No. 26, XX Confer~cia Dos Exircitos Americanos 1992/1993,
August 1992, 26. Although a counterdrug mission is no longer specifically designated
as a mission for the Calha Norte project, it still remains a high priority for the
military. An expanded discussion of this issue occurs later in this chapter.
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(1) Ideologies and Regional Guerrilla Operations. The extent and
location of these threats is probably the area which has changed most
significantly over the last eight years. In 1985 the concerns were focused on
communism infiltrating Brazil from Suriname, and political guerrilla activity
from Peru and Colombia. Since then, some of these threats have subsided
such as the communist threat from Suriname. With the demise of the Soviet
Union, communist expansionism is no longer a viable threat to the
international community, even from Cuba, which is experiencing its own
difficulties. In fact, not only does Cuba no longer provide a threat to Brazil,
but Brazil is courting Cuba as a potential market for Brazilian goods."'
Although the threat of communism has dissipated, it has
been replaced by a military fear of foreign government internationalization of
the Amazon region for economic purposes. This fear first surfaced in 1989
when the Executive Intelligence Review, a Lyndon LaRouche publication,
reported a U.S. interest in invading the Amazon similar to other Latin
American campaigns in Panama and Grenada.' Complicating the situation,
United Nations officials then verbalized potential plans to transfer excess Asian
89
"Franco Meets With Cuban Envoy, Considers Visit to Cuba," 0 Estado Sio Paulo
in Portuguese, 25 March 1993, 6, translated in FBIS, LAT-93-058, 29 March 1993, 30.
See also "Implementation of Air Agreement With Cuba Announced," lornal do Brasil
in Portuguese, 26 February 1993, 2, translated in FBIS, LAT-93-044, 9 March 1993, 6.
90U.S. Government official, Department of State, interviewed by author, 1 April
1993.
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populations to the Amazon region and advanced the notion that Brazil be
recognized a, having only 'relative sovereignty' over the Amazon." The
accuracy of the LaRouche report was highly questionable. Nonetheless, both
these reports served to incite the chief of the Military Command of the
Amazon (CMA), General Antenor de Santa Cruz Abreu, to respond with vows
to "transform the Amazon into a new Vietnam" for ahe industrialized
countries.'2
The majority of Brazilians do not believe that there is a
true international threat to the Amazon, illustrated by (former environmental
secretary) Jose Lutzenburger's dismissal of the idea as "ridiculous nonsense".
Even within military circles the idea is not widely held as a general truth. One
U.S. government official in Brazil estimated that less than 1 percent of the
military take this claim seriously. 3 He hastened to add however, that this 1s
a formidable 1 percent. This was illustrated by the official st,..ements made on
behalf of the Calha Norte project. Army Minister Zenildo Zoroastro de Lucena
""'Internationalisation' of Amazonia Rallying-Point for Militaiy Hardliners," Latin
America Regional Reports: Brazil, RB-92-03, 19 March 1992, 1.
"
9aGeneral to Fight Internationalization of Amazon," Folha de So Paulo. in
Portuguese, 23 July 1991, 1, translated in B LAT-91-147, 24.
"
3U.S. government official, Brasilia, phone interview by author, 17 May 1993.
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defended increasing the resources associated with the project until the
"internationalization theories" could be thoroughly evaluated.'
The instabilities due to guerrilla operations along the
border have changed as well. The supposed threat that the military perceived
from the Shining Path has not materialized either. However, the threat from
the M-19 guerrilla organization has exceeded all the military's expectations.
Their operations have resulted in frequent violations of the border between
Colombia and Brazil, but more importantly have taken the lives of Brazilian
soldiers stationed in the border regions. In February 1991, Colombian
guerrillas attacked and killed three Brazilian soldiers and wounded nine others
in an attempt to free a group of miners that the military had apprehended. 95
This event immediately sparked a cry from the military as well as the general
population for an increased presence in this region. The result was an
additional Cz$300 million of funding for the Calha Norte project and the
creation of a special platoon along the Rio Traira where the incident took
place.9
"'"Calha Norte Project Given Higher Priority," lornal do Brasil in Portuguese, 2
November 1992, 4, translated in FBIS, LAT-92-243, 17 December 1992, 26.
"
5
"Brazilian Border Operations Draw Attention," El Tiempo, in Spanish, 26 March
1991, 6A, translated by FBIS, LAT-91-062, 1 April 1991, 37.
""Calha Norte Project Given Higher Priority," lornal do Brasil in Portuguese, 2
November 1992, 4, translated in FBIS, LAT-92-243, 17 December 1992, 26-27.
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(2) Drug Trafficking. Drug trafficking has continued to make
inroads into Brazil, making it a principal drug trafficiang route for transport of
South American cocaine to the United States and Europe.' Although it
remains a problem within Brazil, it has apparently been dropped from the
rationale of Calha Norte project. In 1985, the area known as Dog Head, was
organized with its main goal as combatting the drug trafficking in the region
and this goal was specifically listed in the Army's stated objectives for the
project. In a 1993 information bulletin published by the Brazilian Army, Calha
Norte's goals failed to address the issue of drug trafficking. However, this
does not come as a surprise. For years the Brazilian military has resisted U.S.
pressure to accept a role in the counterdrug campaign. Their reasons for
hesitancy include a lack of training for the mission, Constitutional prohibition,
and opportunities for ,.arruption.'
The dropping of the counterdrug goal from the project's
objectives could be misleading with regards to the rationale of the project
itself. It would seem that this is no longer a concern of the military especially
when the former CMA, General Santa Cruz, made statements to the press that
97"Drug Trafficking Rise Blamed on Police Crisis," EFE (Madrid), in Spanish, 19
February 1993, translated in FBIS, LAT-93-034, 23 February 1993, 22.
"R•oy I. Kitchener, "The Brazilian Military: Its Role in Counter-Drug Activities,"
Masters Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School Monterey California, June 1992. This
thesis addresses both stated and unstated reasons for the military's hesitancy to
become involved in the drug campaign.
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indicated he thought the problem of drugs coming into the Amazon was "a lot
of crap." However, this view is countered by a 1990 report which emphasized
the problems caused by narcotics traffic in the region and went further to
recommend rapid implementation of the Calha Norte project as a means of
responding to these problems."
Probably the best explanation for the removal of narco-
trafficking as a goal of the project lies within the project structure. In 1985, the
Calha Norte project was started as a joint venture between several civilian and
military ministries. As the project progressed, the civilian ministries began to
pull out due to inadequate funding and inability to attract personnel to work
in the jungle regions.1 "° Because of this, the military was forced to take on a
much greater role than the plan had initially stipulated. Instead of supplying
simply a military presence to the region, the Army officers became the doctors,
the schoolteachers, the law enforcers and the legal system of the project's
settlements. Given that the Calha Norte had in essence become a military
"9"Implementation of Calha Norte Project Urged," Correiro Braziliense, in
Portuguese, 16 November 1990, 5, translated in FBIS, LAT-91-006, 9 January 1991, 24.
Another report, "Army Probing Drug Trafficking in Rondonia," 0 Estado de Sso
Paulo in Portuguese, 22 February 1993, 5, translated in FBIS, LAT-93-035, 24 February
1993, 22, also addresses this subject. In this report, the Army found the Federal Police
organization so permeated with corruption associated with narcotics that they
considered permanently appointing an Army colonel as commander of the police
force.
'1°"Defense of the Calha Norte Project," 0 Estado de Sio Paulo, in Portuguese, 21
March 1987, 2, translated by IPRS item # 10992.
61
project, the Army probably felt its goals should be in line with the Army
objectives of non-involvement with a counter drug campaign. Thus, although
the counterdrug campaign is no longer stipulated in the official goals of the
project, it does still provide a rationale for the Army's involvement in the
region.1°1
(3) Wildcat (illegal) Mining Operations. The problems due to
illegal mining operations have expanded slightly from 1985. The military
estimates that of all economic activities currently being pursued in the Amazon
region, 90 percent of them are illegal or irregular. These problems are now
being compounded by Brazilian prospectors searching for gold in Venezuelan
territory. These expanded operations by the Brazilian miners have resulted in
increasing political tensions between the governments of Brazil and
Venezuela.102
Both Brazil and Venezuela admitted to a need to better
demarcate the border and solve the mining situation when, in 1991, a group of
Venezuelan National Guardsmen evicted 25 FUNAI (the Brazilian Indian
"'
1The military's continued concern with narcotics trafficking in the Amazon is
highlighted in "High Command Studies Troop Reductions," 0 Estado Sio Paulo in
Portuguese, 2 March 1993, 7, translated in FBIS, LAT-93-042, 5 March 1993, 28.
"•"Foreign Minister on Brazilian Prospectors," Caracas Venezolana de Televison
Network (Caracas), in Spanish, 5 February 1993, translated in FBIS, LAT-93-025, 9
February 1993, 40.
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Ministry) employees from the Brazilian town of Hamoxi.'03 Both countries
claimed sovereignty over the area, based on treaties ratified the previous
century. Brazil has since used the resources of the Calha Norte project to help
in the efforts to demarcate the borders in this region.
b. Budgetary Influences
The impact of military budgetary concerns behind the rationale
of the Calha Norte project is not as easy to assess as the geopolitical
connection. In order the prove the thesis of the expanding rationale, this
section will demonstrate that the Calha Norte project is used by the military to
justify its budget during the ongoing Brazilian economic crisis.
Unlike 1985, the military is no longer shielded against budgetary
cutbacks. They are now forced to justify *heir budgets along with all other
governmental agencies. In some cases, even when their expenditures are
justified they fail to receive monies as illustrated in the military pay debate.
The military pay debate probably best exemplifies the changes
in the Army's ability to "write its own check." In 1988, a military lobby effort
successfully resulted in the legislature authorizing a salary increase of 130
percent, making them the highest paid employees in the federal sector.'14 By
1991, military pay scales had fallen behind almost every other government
'"
3
"Venezuelan Military Incursions Reported," EFE (Madrid), in Spanish, 1 October




sector pay scale. A move was made by the military to procure a 20 percent
pay raise that would have narrowed the margin of the pay scales but would
not have equated them. This move was unsuccessful, as Congress vetoed a
Presidential decree that would have implemented the raise. The problem
continued to plague the military in 1992 as they argued for a 301 percent
salary increase to compensate for prior losses.105
Not only did the military have problems procuring adequate
salaries but they were also unable to get funding for operational missions. In
1993, the military's budget as a share of total government expenditures had
decreased to only 2.6 percent of the federal budget, compared to 27 percent in
1983. This budget reduction resulted in the slowed progress of the Calha
Norte project, reduction in working hours for soldiers, and the degradation of
operational assets due to lack of maintenance funds.106
"1°"Armed Forces Protest Congress Salary Decision," EFE (Madrid), in Spanish, 3
July 1991, translated in FBIS, LAT-91-129, 5 July 1991, 26. See also "Military Wage
Issue Continues to Simmer," 0 Globo in Portuguese, 5 December 1990, 20, translated
in FBIS, LAT-91-006, 9 January 1991, 26. This article describes the numerical disparity
between military and other sector salaries. It cites the example of a police chief,
retired from the federal police, that earns 476,000 cruzeiros compared a general with
45 years of service receives 260,000 cruzeiros. See also "Military Requests 301 Percent
Salary Increase," 0 Globo in Portuguese, 13 December 1992, 3, translated in FBIS,
LAT-92-240, 14 December 1992, 33.
"1°"Senator Reports Further Cuts in Military Budget," ]ornal do Brasil, in
Portuguese, 5 December 1993, 3, translated in FBIS LAT-92-243, 17 December 1992.
See also "Army's Financial Difficulties Highlighted," 0 Estado Sio Paulo, in
Portuguese, 11 August 1990, 5, translated in FBIS LAT-90-158, 15 August 1990,20. For
more on operations effects of the budget crisis see "Army General Views Defense
Industry Prospects," Tecnologia & Defesa, in Portuguese, May-June 1992, 5-8,
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As the military budget shrinks, the Army has seemingly focused
more emphasis on the Calha Norte project. Amidst the budgetary cuts that
began in 1989, the Army proclaimed that the FT-90 program (the program
which the Calha Norte project is under) would not be cut "even if other
projects would have to be postponed."1 "7 The Army coordinated with the
Superintendency for the Development of the Amazon (SADEN) and put
together a book titled Calha Norte: Frontier of the Future. This book was an
attempt to explain and justify the resource needs for the project. The book
makes the argument that in order to accomplish the goals of the project, it
should receive Cz$20 billion vice the Cz$11 billion it is allotted. It goes further
to defend and detail specifically the costs associated with each aspect of the
project--an action, which in previous times the military had not been required
to perform.'1"
Other examples of the project being used to obtain operating
funds include the Army presenting the project as the country's primary vehicle
for achieving the "grandeza." Numerous Army statements have identified the
translated in FBIS, LAT-92-227, 24 November 1992, 31-34. See also "Impact of Military
Budget Cuts Surveyed," Isto E/Senhor in Portuguese, 22 April 1992, 26-29, translated
in FBIS, LAT-92-107, 3 June 1992, 29-32.
'0 7Translated and reported in FBIS, LAT-89-012a, 19 January 1989, 4.
'08"Calha Norte Project To Get Cz$11 Billion," lornal do Brasil in Portuguese, 1
December-1988, 12, translated in FBIS, LAT-89-012a, 19 January 1989, 4. See also
"Minister Defends Border Project, Requests Money," lornal do Brasil in Portuguese,
22 August 1991, 9, translated in FBIS, LAT-91-202-A, 18 October 1991, 2.
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project with "national security and development" and of premier importance to
Brazil. They are also quick to point out that although the project was initially
started as an interministerial venture, the armed forces have been primarily
responsible for its implementation. The lobbying efforts for the Calha Norte
project have resulted in a nearly doubling of the project's budget and
personnel."°9
c. Institutional Legitimacy Influences
As illustrated in the previous section, the Army was able to
successfully defend its institutional legitimacy following their removal from
power in 1985. However, events in the subsequent years coupled with the
revelation of harsh excesses of authoritarian rule, especially in the late 1960's
and early 1970's, made the public question the legitimacy of the armed forces.
The most prominent scandal was the "uniform" scandal. This incident
involved the Army using questionable procurement procedures to obtain
material such as clothing, linens, etc.."1 ' The public and media responded to
this scandal with harsh criticism of the Army's actions. In addition to calls for
external investigations into the matter, the press questioned the usefulness of
""'U.S. Government Official, Washington, D.C., interviewed by author, 29 March
1993. See also "Calha Norte Project Given Higher Priority," ]ornal do Brasil, in
Portuguese, 2 November 1992, 4, translated in FBIS, LAT-92-243, 17 December 1992,
26.
""1A more detailed account of this event can be found in "Army Approves Inflated
Bids for Uniforms," 0 Globo in Portuguese, 20 October 1991, reported and translated
in FBIS. LAT-91-205, 23 October 1991, 16.
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an armed forces organization at all. One report termed the actions of the
military as the "Samba of the Nutty Soldier" and described in detail the
military's failure to run a government (1964-1985) as well as their current
inability to run a military."'
This loss of legitimacy has also affected the military's autonomy
with respect to determining its operational policies and priorities. A March
1993 newspaper article related that military men have been excluded from
major national decisions that relate to issues of national security and
specifically the Amazon policy.1 1 2
In an attempt to restore this legitimacy, the Army has tried to
project themselves as the nation builders, developers, and keepers of Brazilian
national security. The current military leadership believes that continued
national development is the solution to the Brazilian economic crisis. The
Army has unrelentingly touted the Calha Norte project as the solution for
unlocking the economic potential of the Amazon and therefore as of
fundamental importance to Brazil. Additionally, they have cited the project as
"'"Utility, Strength of the Armed Forces Debated," Vea, in Portuguese, 25
September 1991, translated in FBIS LAT-91-204, 22 October 1991, 25. In this article
the author cites the uniform scandal, the "threat" of internationalization of the
Amazon, and other military embarrassments to make highlight the ineptness of the
military. He continues by postulating that no military would be better than a military
which bases operational plans on absurd scenarios and misuse of assets.
"
2
"Military Club's Presidents Meet with President Franco," 0 Estado de Sio Paulo
in Portuguese, 9 March 1993, 5, translated by FBIS (Asuncion PA), in message dated
R 101245Z MAR 93.
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responsible for expanding the transportation infrastructure, strengthening trade
cooperation with neighboring countries, and facilitating well-organized
exploitation of water and mineral resources."'
The Army has displayed the same aggressiveness promoting its
critical role within Calha Norte as it has trying to make national development
synonymous with the project. Army press releases and official interviews
constantly reference the expanded role that the military is playing within the
project, given that other ministries have defaulted on their responsibilities to
the project."" These reports and interviews have attempted to restore the
public's confidence in the Army by presenting them in their historical role as
nation builders. They downplay the military importance of the project, instead
stressing how the project is directly affecting civilians of the region and the
nation. Examples which they used to illustrate this national importance are:
improvement of the infrastructure (international and domestic roads, and
airstrips); provision of law and order to facilitate development; and most
importantly, introduction of basic social services to the region.- 5
13"Minister Defends Border Project, Requests Money," |ormal do Brasil, in
Portuguese, 22 August 1991, 9, translated in FBIS, LAT-91-202-A, 18 October 1991, 2.
See also "Calha Norte Project Given Higher Priority," lornal do Brasil, in Portuguese,
2 November 1992, 4, translated in FBIS, LAT-92-243, 17 December 1992, 26.
"114"Calha Norte Program to be Decelerated," 0 Globo in Portuguese, 7 June 1991,
7, translated in FBIS LAT-91-133, 11 July 1991, 33.
'"See Boletim Informativo, N'.26: XX Confer~ncia Dos Exircitos Americanos 24-26.
See also "Calha Norte Project Given higher Priority," 26, "Implementation of Calha
Norte Project Urged," 24 and "Minister Defends Border Project, Requests Money," 2.
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C. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
Unquestionably, geopolitics had a large role to play in shaping the Calha
Norte project in 1985. This conclusion is supported by the stated goals of the
project, force locations, and the Army's historical involvement in the Amazon.
What is just as apparent, following a review of the events, is that justification
of a military budget and institutional legitimacy concerns did not play a
significant role in implementing the project initially.
During the early and mid-1980's, the Brazilian Army retained a great deal
of autonomy with regard to defining their own budget. In fact, one Army
official felt that they gained even more autonomy over military budgetary
matters by relinquishing power to the civilians in 1985."6 The Armed Forces
budget actually increased substantially following the transfer of power to the
civilian regime in 1985.1"7 The end result is that the military was able to get
virtually any monies it wanted, with little or no justification for its
expenditures. Thus, they had no reason to use the Calha Norte project as a
justification for the military budget.
""Alfred Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone,
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988, 72.
"17Military expenditures as a percentage of Central Government Expenditures were
3.2 percent in 1979 and dropped to 2.1 percent in 1985. Following the transfer of
power to the civilians, this percentage was increased to 2.5 percent the very next year.
Data taken from the World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1990
(WMEAT), U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 55.
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Similar to the budgetary issue, institutional legitimacy concerns were not
included in the rationale behind the Army's push behind the Caiha Norte
project. Though the military had been discredited as political rulers, they still
retained substantial legitimacy as a military institution. This fact was clearly
illustrated behind the public acceptance of their historical role of external and
internal defense of Brazilian society as well as the Armed Forces' successful
efforts that prevented the consolidation of the three forces into a single
ministry. Again, due to this solid foundation of legitimacy, the Army was not
required to use the project as a means of supporting or reestablishing their
legitimacy as a military institution.
However, by 1993 the dynamics of the military situation had changed
from 1985. In 1993, as in 1985, geopolitics played a significant role in forming
the rationale behind the Calha Norte project. Border insurgencies, drug
trafficking, and illegal mining operations still provided a strong rationale to
continue the project in 1993. However, contrary to the situation in 1985,
geopolitics was not the only factor that comprised the rationale to implement
Calha Norte. The political climate within Brazil had changed such that the
Army no longer enjoyed its same status with regard to financial autonomy or
mission integrity.
By 1993, the Brazilian economic crisis had become even more severe, and
the military were forced to surrender some of the budgetary autonomy that
they had exercised previously. The military, like all other federal agencies,
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were now required to justify their operational expenses in order to continue to
receive funding. Complicating this matter was the uncovering of institutional
scandals and other embarrassing events. These new revelations, combined
with the previous 21 years of authoritarian rule, caused the Brazilian media
and public to take a closer look at the military and their role and mission
within society. The media began to question the need for an armed services,
which served to hinder the military's request for additional funding. The
combination of these events forced the military to not only justify their budget,
but also their very existence as Brazil's guardians.
Calha Norte provided the Army with nearly the perfect solution to meet
both of these new needs. It was a nation-building project that began as a joint
venture between military and civilians whose goals were to benefit the civil
society. The virtual exit of the civilian agencies from the project allowed the
military to expand and fill the voids left by civilians. It now provided the
military the perfect tool to justify both a budget (a military operation) and
their new role and mission (developing the Amazon for civilian benefits).118
Thus, the rationale for the Calha Norte project has expanded since 1985 to
include justification for the military's budget and relegitimation of the
""It should be noted that this is not really a new mission for the military, as they
have historically been regarded as the nation builders and they have previously
sought to develop the Amazon (see: History of Brazil in the Amazon). However, this
represents the first plan offered by the military for a coordinated and supervised
development of the Amazon instead of the previous laissez-faire plans.
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institution. This expanded rationale has a noticeable physical effect on both
the finances and resources assigned to the Calha Norte project by the Brazilian
Army. In 1985, the commissioning year for Calha Norte, the project consisted
of eight platoons stationed along strategic points on the borders. Command of
each of these frontier posts was relegated to a junior officer. The initial plan
called for the gradual increase in the number of platoons to eleven over the
course of five years. Today, the project consists of nineteen platoons that are
overseen by a brigade commander. Additionally, a brigadier general, the
CMA, has been headquartered in Manaus to oversee all Amazon operations.
Other moves intended to augment the military presence represented by the
Calha Norte program incluc, the transfer of two battalions and one brigade to
the Amazon region.
The question still remaiis, can this expanded rationale explain the
Army's increased presence in the Amazon Basin? If one were to look at the
way which the Army has promoted the Calha Norte project and its self-
defined new mission, the answer is yes. As illustrated above, the Army has
been required to define its mission within the Brazilian community and fight
for financial resources. It has used the Calha Norte extensively to accomplish
both of these tasks.
With regard to defining their mission, the project has proven quite
effective for the military. The collapse of communism and the warming of
relations with Argentina lett the Brazilian armed forces without an enemy to
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confront. The objectives of the Calha Norte project have served to establish a
credible enemy in the form of drug traffickers, guerrillas, and other
international forces that threaten to violate Brazilian sovereignty.
Consequently, the project has provided the Army with a mission of defending
the Amazon, which in turn has justified their expansion of the Calha Norte
program.
In addition to providing protection of the region, the armed forces have
ascribed to being the developers of the region. Aeronautics minister Brigadier
General Octavio Moreiro Lima stated that "only the armed forces are in a
position to initiate an orderly process of settling the border region."'119 The
Army and the other military services are quick to point out that the project
was initially started as a joint effort between various military and civilian
ministries, with the Army's responsibility being to provide a military presence
in the region. They also point out that the civilian ministries have forsaken the
project due to the excessive hardships associated with the jungle environment
and that the Army has stepped in to assume their obligations."2 These
additional responsibilities which they shouldered have served to highlight their
"
9
"Defense of Ca!ha Norte Project," 0 Estado Sao Paulo. in Portuguese, 21 March
1987, 2, translated in IPRS, item #10992.
'2See "Strategic Affairs Secretary Mario Cesar Flores," 0 Estado Sao Paulo in
Portuguese, 13 October 1992, 5, translated in FBIS, LAT-92-216-S, 6 November 1992,
44. See also "Defense of Calha Norte Project" and "Caiha Norte Project Given Higher
Priority".
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role as pioneers of Amazon regional development, but also the new civic
action role designed to benefit the local population.
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III. IMPLICATIONS FOR CALHA NORTE PROTECT
Any military movement of significance has effects that can be felt
throughout regional and international communities. These effects can be
negative or positive depending on the specific situation. The Calha Norte
project is no exception to this rule, as it has had both beneficial and
detrimental impacts on each of these communities. This section will define
and then evaluate the most serious of the implications associated with the
Calha Norte project. The issues that will be evaluated are: 1) border conflicts;
2) the environment; and 3) narco-trafficking.
A. POTENTIAL CONFLICTS
Border problems have long been a source of tension between Brazil and
its neighbors, although they have not led to war this century. In his historical
recount, "Geopolitics of the Amazon", Lewis A. Tambs stated that instabilities
between Venezuela and Guyana, as well as the Peruvian Marcha para ]a Selva
(March to the Forest) caused Brazil '3 intensify its presence in the Amazon
region. As noted previously in Chapter I, nearly all land disputes between
Latin countries have been resolved on the basis of uti possidetis de facto. While
the political environment does not promote the expansionist policies of the
past, the unstable national boundaries of the Amazon could cause countries to
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challenge each other's claims on forest resources."2 ' Furthermore, the
unmarked boundaries give rise to questions of illegal immigration and
settlement that generate additional sources of friction between countries.
Calha Norte's buildup of military assets along the Amazon border has
the potential to heighten the level of tensions between adjoining countries.
This proved to be true when the project was initially revealed in 1986.
Delegations from each of the border countries expressed to Itamaraty (Brazil's
Ministry of Foreign Relations) apprehensions over Brazil's intentions in the
region.'2 However, to assume that regional tensions will be heightened
across the board would be inaccurate, as each of the Amazon border countries
has a different relationships with Brazil. Therefore, in order to accurately
assess how Calha Norte has influenced the potential for regional conflict, each
of the border countries must be looked at individually.
"'
2 Robert J. Buschbacher explains that "national boundaries in the Amazon Basin
region are sometimes rivers, sometimes watershed divides, but often there are no such
natural delimitations. The frontier may be only an unmarked line running through
the middle of the rain forest... River boundaries shift as new channels are cut and old
ones are filled. Watershed divides change as new streams are discovered. Unmarked
boundaries through rain forests are vague, and claims are easily challenged...
Establishing a presence is an act of sovereignty and can serve as a precedent in any
border disputes." See Robert J. Buschbacher, "Deforestation for Sovereignty Over
Remote Frontiers," in Amazonian Rain Forests: Ecosystems Disturbance and Recovery.
ed. Carl F. Jordan, New York: Springer-Verlag, 1987, 46.
"mElizabeth Allen, "Calha Norte: Military Development in Brazilian Amaz6nia",
Development and Change Vol. 23 (1992), 89.
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Colombia
Calha Norte was specifically developed to combat border problems
between Brazil and Colombia. As discussed in Chapter II, M-19 guerrillas had
frequently crossed the border and harassed project platoons in the region.
This led to Brazilian forces initiating an offensive into Colombian Amazon
territory using land troops and fighter aircraft to combat the rebels. Tensions
between the two countries increased when Brazilian forces detained two
Colombian miners in international waters on the Taraira River during a search
for the guerrillas. Additionally, Brazilian troops entered Colombian mines and
opened fire killing three Colombian miners."2
These actions have apparently not created too much animosity between
Colombia and Brazil, given that the topics were discussed during "routine
bilateral talks.""l In fact, these border incursions by the guerrillas have
served to increase cooperation between Colombian troops and the Calha Norte
platoons so as to address a common enemy. In March 1991, the CMA and
commander of the Colombian Army's 4th Division met to devise joint plans to
combat the guerrilla forces. The meeting also produced information
exchanges, bilateral agreements on military cooperation, and other joint
'
23
"Brazilian Border Operations Draw Attention," El Tiempo (Bogota), in Spanish,




proposals between the two countries.12' Indications of further strengthening
of ties came later in September 1991, when the two presidents met and signed
agreements concerning joint economic proposals, promotion of development,
and cooperation in the mutual legal assistance mechanisms. Probably the most
significant outcome of this meeting was the expressed joint satisfaction in
border operations involving both countries.1"
Calha Norte has not adversely affected relations with Colombia, and in
fact has probably improved them. As long as the project's goals, with regards
io the border, remain complementary to Colombia's goals, there will be no
adverse effects on relations between the two countries.
Venezuela
Venezuela is the country where tensions with Brazil have increased the
most. The cause of this tension is directly related to one of the primary goals
of the Calha Norte project, settlement of the region. This goal of the project
has encouraged both the legal and wildcat miners (garimpeiros) to advance
'2"Joint Antiterrorist Actions Planned With Colombia," Brasilia Radio Nacional da
Amazonia Network, in Portuguese, 1000 GMT, 5 March 1991, translated in FBIS LAT-
91-044, 6 March 1991, 21. See also "Army Readies Anti-Guerrilla Plans with Brazil,"
Ef.e (Madrid), in Spanish, 0209 GMT, 11 March 1991, translated in FBIS, LAT-91-047,
11 March 1991, 40.
12 '"Agreements Signed, Joint Declarations," Brasilia Voz do Brasil Network, in
Portuguese, 2200 GMT, 3 September 1991, translated in FBIS, LAT-91-171, 4 September
1991, 33.
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deeper into the Amazon as they plunder the area for its resources. It has
resulted in numerous illegal infringements on Venezuelan territories and
destruction of Venezuelan land due to primitive mining techniques."
Venezuela has responded to these issues through both political and
military channels. In the political arena, the Venezuelan government has
attempted to work with the Brazilian government to find a solution to the
problem, but has been unsuccessful thus far. These efforts were hampered
when the candidate for the post of Brazilian ambassador to Venezuela
commented that "Brazilian and Venezuelan military officers [were] interested
in maintaining an atmosphere of confrontation."1" such as these have only
resulted in the deterioration of relations between the two countries, making the
possibility of a quick diplomatic solution remote.
In addition to the war of words between Brazil and Venezuela, Venezuela
has declared war on the miners. In April 1989, a group of 3,000 Brazilian
miners was discovered in Venezuelan territory.1" The mining camp had
been established over one year and was equipped with a landing strip. After
the miners had been returned to Brazil, Fernando CUsar Mesquita, the Brazilian
127A description of the mining techniques and the subsequent damage it imposes
on the environment is described in the environmental section of this chapter.
lu"Foreign Minister on Brazilian Prospectors", Caracas Venezolana de Television




"Venezuelan Military to Expel 3,000 Miners" Efe (Madrid), in Spanish, 1556
GMT, 9 May 1989, translated in FBiS, LAT-89-089, 10 May 1989, 41.
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Environmental Institute Chairman, attempted to land on the airstrip to meet
with Venezuelan authorities concerning the situation. Venezuela's response
was to chase Mesquita's helicopter back to Brazil, using Venezuelan fighter
planes. In January of 1993, Venezuela arrested forty-six Brazilian miners they
claimed were operating in Venezuelan territory.-" The Brazilians claimed
they were operating in Brazilian territory, intensifying the tension between the
two nations and raising the issue of border demarcation.
The Calha Norte project could serve to ease tensions between Brazil and
Venezuela if the Army uses the project to curb the excesses associated with
both legal and illegal mining activities. In fact, as recently as February 1992,
the Calha Norte platoons and Venezuelan troops performed joint operations to
remove more than 10,000 gold prospectors who illegally occupied the area.""
Continued successful operations and cooperation between the two militaries
could serve to defuse the strained relationship between Brazil and Venezuela.
"
3
°"Itamaraty to Investigate Brazilian Held in Venezuela", Rio de laneiro Rede
Globo Television in Portuguese, 1600 GMT, 11 February 1993, translated in FBIS,
LAT-93-028, 12 February 1993, 17.
"
131"Operations Begin To Remove Brazilian Gold Prospectors", Caracas Venezolana
de Television in Spanish, 0000 GMT, 28 February 1993, translated in FBIS, LAT-93-
038, 1 March 1993, 44.
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Guyana
Border conflicts between Brazil and Guyana began in 1904. Brazil lost
territory rich in mineral wealth to Guyana when, through arbitration, the king
of Italy ruled in favor of Guyana. In 1969, the Guyanese Revolution overthrew
the English colonial rulers, and chased the English citizens into Brazil. This
resulted in a skirmish of gunfire between the two nations. The subsequent
installation of a socialist government in Guyana, guided by Cuba, prompted
Brazil to increase its presence along the border via the Calha Norte project.
More recently, tensions flared slightly when Brazilian miners moved their
operations into the Potari-Siparuni area of eastern Guyana.-' However, the
number of these miners was insignificant and Brazil was able to extract them
from the region fairly quickly.
For the most part, Brazil and Guyana have cultivated a friendly political
relationship since 1985. This relationship has yielded cooperation in several
areas such as health programs, agriculture and livestock development,
telecommunications and forest and mineral reserve programs. Thus, while
Calha Norte increases Brazil's military resources along the border, it has not
significantly added to the tensions between the two nations.
"
3
"President Declares Brazilian Mining Illegal," Cana (Bridgetown), in English,
2116 GMT, 27 April 1990, reported in FBIS, LAT-90-083, 30 April 1990, 56.
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Suriname
Like Guyana, the political stability of Suriname was one of the factors
that initiated the Calha Norte project. Although the project was designed to
keep unwanted socialist influences out of Brazil, it has not noticeably affected
relations between the two countries. In June 1991, Brazil voiced the desire to
reinforce political and economic ties between the two governments." This
news was favorably received in Suriname. In November 1992, the former
dictator Desire Bouterse resigned as Armed Forces Commander prompting
speculation of an attempted "military adventure" by Bouterse. Brazil was
quick to reaffirm its commitment to the administration, demonstrating its
positive relationship with the constitutional Surinamese government."
Calha Norte has not threatened the Surinamese government and has
therefore not adverselv affected Suriname's relations with Brazil. Further,
Suriname may view the project as a source of security. With an unstable
political situation, and in light of the public support demonstrated by Brazil,
Suriname could use the Brazilian military presence on the border to discourage
political adventurism within the country. Thus, in this case, Suriname may
actually encourage the growth of Calha Norte.
"
33
"Collor Congratulates Suriname on Election Process," Paramaribo Radio
Suriname International in English, 1730 GMT, 10 June 1991, reported in FBIS, LAT-
91-114, 13 June 1991, 32.
""
3
"Government Supports Surinamese Government," Efe (Madrid), in Spanish, 2223
GMT, 26 November 1992, translated in FBIS LAT-92-233, 3 December 1992, 23.
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French Guiana
The French have not had any negative reactions to the military buildup
by Brazil. Like Brazil, France views the problems of drug trafficking and gold
smuggling as destabilizing. They have welcomed increased Brazilian efforts to
eradicate the problems and have offered their cooperation. In March 1993, the
two countries signed a treaty of mutual cooperation to combat gold and wood
smuggling and narco-trafficking, using each country's custom agency as the
focal point of collaboration.135 If Calha Norte proves to be successful with
regards to combatting these problems, the two countries could expand their
treaty to encompass joint military operations as well.
Overall, none of the countries view the Calha Norte presence on their
border as an invasion threat. It has increased tensions only in Venezuela, not
because of the project itself, but because of the mining operations it has
attracted to the Amazon. If Brazil does not rein in these renegade miners,
history has shown their presence will continue to grow and spread into other
countries. This will definitely result in strained relations between Brazil and
Venezuela and, if left unchecked, could escalate out of control.
"S"Agreement Signed With France on Drug, Gold Trafficking," Brasilia Voz do
Brasil Network in Portuguese, 2200 GMT, 19 March 1993, translated in FBI15 LAT-93-
053, 22 March 1993, 27.
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B. ENVIRONMENTAL IMPLICATIONS
Probably the most controversial topic with regards to the Calhe Norte
project has been the environmental concerns raised by domestic and
international activists. The environmental impact of the project has been a
source of friction between the military and environmental activists, and has
hampered the growth of the project as originally envisaged.
The controversy centers around Calha Norte's goal to strategically
develop the region for economic benefit. The Army's actions have provided
physical and financial incentives, encouraging miners to migrate to the
Amazon in search of gold and other mineral wealth. The Calha Norte project
has provided miners with an infrastructure (airstrips, housing, etc.) that has
been largely funded by the project's operations. These miners have been the
source of environmentalist criticism. First, the mining operations have been
responsible for numerous human rights violations against the indigenous
population, jeopardizing their very survival. SeLondly, most of the mining
operations are small and not technically advanced (especially the illegal
operations). The primitive mining techniques have resulted in significant
pollution and destruction of local habitats.
One fourth of Brazil's 220,000 Indian population occupies about 20
percent of the land in the Calha Norte project. This has become the focal point
of the environmental controversy surrounding the projects, given that "the
areas surveyed as richer in mineral deposits are situated in indigenous
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[lands] ...inhabited by the Yanomami Indians.""' The potential wealth
present in the Calha Norte region has been estimated at over US$134 billion,
enough to repay almost all of Brazil's foreign debt." Miners and other
business enterprises, such as timber traders, have forcibly removed large
numbers of the Indian population to gain access to these resources. Removal
tactics have included abduction, terrorism, torture, and murder Furthermore,
the exposure of the Indians to these outsiders has resulted in an epidemic of
malaria, gripe, colds, and influenza affecting more than 4,500 of the
Indians."3'
While the Calha Norte project was originally commissioned to establish a
sensible Indian policy in the region, it has served only to confuse and worsen
the plight of the Indians. The project certainly has the capability to remove the
prospectors if it wanted to do so, as it proved in the Surucucu region in
January of 1985. Recently, however, the project seems to favor the miners and
timber merchants more than the Indians. In January 1990, the military
succumbed to domestic and international pressure to remove the miners from
Indian lands. The Army halted the operation the next day, citing the potential
'•
3 J.P. de Oliveiro Filho, "Seguranqa das frontieras e o novo indigenismo: formas
e linhagem do Projeto Calha Norte", Antropologia e Indigenismo (1990), volume 1, 15-
33.
137Bob Levin and Moyra Ashford, "The Last Frontier," Maclean's 19 January 1987,
28.
"'Linda Rabben, "Amazon Gold Rush: Brazil's Military Stakes its Claim," The
Nation 12 March 1990, vol. 250, n.10, 341.
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for the miners' armed resistance. The decision to allow more than 40,000
garimpeiros to remain on Yanomami land was essentially a military decision.
The Army's pro-miner position was highlighted by official statements made by
the Army minister who said "Indians don't deserve to keep their lands because
they're idle and lazy, don't work, and don't cultivate the soil."'"
The Army's inaction regarding protection of Indian lands has resujle-d in
a population explosion of miners, exploding from the original 60 armed
prospectors of the Surucucu region to an estimated 50,000 prospectors present
in the region today."14 This increase in population has intensified violence
against the Indians, reducing some tribes to less than 10 members."" The
military and government's failure to address this aspect of the Calha Norte
project has allowed this violence to escalate with impunity. One author has
suggested that the Army's indifference is due to soldiers participating in
goldmining activities.'42 If the current situation continues, the very existence
of the Indian population will be threatened.
139Rabben, 341.
'•
4 Allen, 91. Official estimates of the garimpeiro population place the number of
miners between 30,000-35,000. However, sources involved in the Amazon region have
stated that the number could be as high as 100,000.
"'
4
"Brazil: Indigenous People Under Siege by Land Grabbers," EcoNet, Inter Press
Service (1993), 0546:17 GMT, 9 February 1993.
"'Rabben, 341.
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In addition to the human rights issues, the mining operations have also
increased the amount of environmental pollution in the Amazon. Goldmining
operations extract the gold deposits using cheap, but highly destructive,
removal methods. Typically, the removal takes place in the riverbeds. Miners
use high pressure water pumps to erode river banks, producing a muddy
effluent that potentially contains gold. This phase of the process ruins the
natural habitats of local species, as well as destroying the vegetation. The
miners then channel the muddy runoff into troughs, adding large quantities of
toxic mercury compounds to separate the gold from the mud. Most of this
mercury cannot be recovered, escaping into the river where it poisons the food
chain.1"3
These destructive mining practices, if left unchecked, could endanger the
very survival of the Amazon. Ecologist David Quammen describes the
Amazon as a very sensitive ecosystem in which every aspect of the system is
interdependent on the others for its survival.'" Thus the destruction of a
tree or oi the surrounding humus would result in the death of the surrounding
area.
Consequently, if the Calha Norte project continues to ignore the actions
of miners and timber merchants, the survival of the Amazon and its
143Andres L. Pacheco, Staff Engineer, Aspen Technology, Inc., phone interview by
author, 14 May 1993.
'"Quammen, 45.
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inhabitants is questionable. Past performance would indicate that the Army
does not see a problem in the area. Retired General Antenor Santa Cruz,
former head of the CMA and now retired, has publicly stated that "all the
tropical forest remains intact," rejecting theories that the Amazon was
adversely affected by these development influences. He went further, saying
that people should not concern themselves with the Indians as "no one is
better off' in Brazil.1  Current Brazilian policies do not support a stronger
stand on the part of the Calha Norte project with respect to the environment.
The policies in place favor big mining corporations and programs that will
develop the region into an economically productive sector of Brazil."' The
future of the Amazon environment, therefore, appears to be one of continual
decline.
"•"General Defends 'Calha Norte' Project," Zero Hora (Porto Allegre), in
Portuguese, 13 June 1992, translated and reported in USDAO document Brazil #IIR 6
809 0573 92. Interestingly, the General based his opinion of the welfare of the Indians
based on their land holdings. He stated that Indian reserves totalled 900,000 kmi,
which averages 400 hectares per Indian. He failed to note that specific tracts of land
change on almost a monthly basis due to mining permits granted by the government
Additionally, he made no mention of the brutality that is used to uproot the Indians
from their land when it is expropriated.
'*For a more in depth description of the environmental policies of Brazil see Bruce
Allen, "Indian Lands, Environmental Policy and Military Geopolitics in the
Development of the Brazilian Amazon: The Case of the Yanomami," Development and
Change (1992), vol. 23, 35-70.
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C. COUNTERDRUG IMPLICATIONS
One of Calha Norte's original goals was to combat narco-trafficking in the
Amazon region. And, though it is not specifically delineated in the most
current mission statement, counterdrug operations remain a high priority for
project coordinators. According to U.S. government officials, however, the
project has made little impact on drug-trafficking within the border
regions."' The failure of the program, with regards to this goal, is attributed
to a lack of sufficient presence in the region. Only 19 platoons exist, manned
by approximately 70 soldiers each. Of these soldiers only 30 are trained for
combat, the rest providing administrative and supply support for the
installation. This translates to about 570 soldiers responsible for 1,200,000 km2,
or 2100 km2 per soldier. Small wonder, then that the project has had little
effect on the drug problem.
In response to this situation, the Amazon Command has proposed the
installation of a radar system, which would monitor air space over the
Amazon for small aircraft. The project would identify potential drug-
smuggling aircraft and then direct troops to interdict and apprehend the
perpetrators.l' This program would enhance current efforts, as border
""U.S. Government Official, Office of the Secretary of Defense, interview by
author, Washington, DC, 27 March 1993.
'"For an in-depth description of this system see "Amazon Surveillance System,"
pamphlet published by the Brazilian Air Force, distributed to the United States
Department of Defense, 1992.
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platoons now lack any dedicated air support that would enable them to
respond to crisis areas. However, similar systems employed by the U.S. in the
fight against drugs have been relatively unsuccessful. It is unlikely then, that
the new Brazil;an initiative will prove successful, given that the program is
responsible for more area and employs fewer people in the operation.
Another counterdrug operation that used Calha Norte forces was the
dynamiting of airstrips used by drug traffickers in the state of Roraima.149
This operation was relatively unsuccessful given that the airstrips were
repaired within one week of their destruction."0
Currently Calha Norte forces do not have the ability to affect the drug-
trafficking operations that plague the area. Even with the proposed increase in
materiel, the project still lacks the resources to effectively combat the problem.
To provide an effective campaign against drug-trafficking, Brazil must dedicate
more assets to the Amazon region. If more assets are not assigned for the
149"Destruction of Clandestine Airstrips to Begin," Brasilia Radio Nacional da
Amazonia Network, in Portuguese, 1000 GMT, 2 May 1990, translated in FBIS, LAT-
90-086, 3 May 1990, 32. See also "Blasting of Clandestine Landing Strips Continues,"
Brasilia Domestic Service, in Portuguese, 2200 GMT, 14 May 1990, translated in FBIS,
LAT-90-094, 15 May 1990, 26.
150U.S. Government Official, Office of Secretary of Defense, interview by author,
Washington, DC, 29 March 1993.
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counter-drug campaign, no significant progress will be realized in this
fight.151
D. U.S. POLICY OPTIONS
It is unrealistic to believe the United States could unilaterally influence
the Calha Norte project via U.S. policy measures. However, given that U.S.
security interests (primarily counterdrug) are affected by Calha Norte it is not
unreasonable for the U.S. to formulate a policy that addresses the program.
Such a U.S. policy could take the form of one of four options: 1) opposition; 2)
benign neglect; 3) indirect support; and 4) direct support. These policy options
are listed in order of magnitude of U.S. support for the project, from lowest to
highest, and are described below.
Opposition
The Catholic Church, human rights, and environmental organizations
have lobbied to have the Calha Norte project cease operations. These efforts
stem from allegations that the military has abandoned their protective mission
of the Indians in support of the military's regional development mission. The
groups argue that the military has given little consideration to designated
"'
1The author is heavily indebted to Roy Kitchener for his views and research on
the Brazilian Military and their role in counter-drug activities. See "The Brazilian
Military- Its Role in Counter-drug Activities," Master's Thesis, Naval Postgraduate
School, June 1992.
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Indian lands when planning developmental projects that in turn have
destroyed much of the Indians' habitat. They additionally argue that the
military has increasingly sided with mining interests when resolving land
dispute issues. This in turn has further endangered the survival of the
Indians. The critics use these points to advocate curtailing the Calha Norte
project instead of enlarging it. Such arguments suggest that the United States
should adopt a policy of opposition to Calha Norte.
The environmentalists' accusations are only half correct. While the
military is not entirely innocent, neither are they directly responsible. The
garimpeiros and their operations are mainly responsible for these atrocities
while the military is only guilty of observing and doing nothing to stop it.
Requiring the military to scale down or abandon Calha Norte will do nothing
to improve the situation in the Amazon with regards to these issues as the
miners will still remain.
This policy option is not recommended because it would not solve the
problems in the Amazon and it would most likely result in the United States
losing future opportunities to affect Brazilian policy. As presented above, the
Calha Norte project, and its associated goals, have become of great significance
to the Brazilian military with regard to defining their role and mission.
Consequently, any attempt to oppose this project would certainly be viewed as
interventionist, and therefore would be hotly contested by the military and
civilians alike. The nationalistic feelings incited by such a move would
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effectively remove the United States from any type of bargaining leverage that
they may enjoy today with Brazil.
This paper does not suggest, nor intend to imply, that relations with
Brazil are critical to the survival of the United States or the future success of
its policies. However, the Latin American region is slowly emerging as a force
to be reckoned with both economically and militarily.15" Alienation of Brazil
at this stage of U.S.-Brazilian relations could present unsurmountable obstacles
towards improving relations in the future. This disaffection would directly
curtail the prospects of an expanded U.S. regional role for later negotiations.
Benign Neglect
The "benign neglect" option would have the U.S. essentially ignore
Brazilian moves in the Amazon. This option assumes that, no matter what
Brazil chooses with regard to the Calha Norte project, it will not produce any
outcomes that would drastically change the Amazonian situation with respect
to U.S. objectives. Consequently, the U.S. would not have to expend
"'
2Both Chile and Argentina have demonstrated strong, sound economic policies
that have translated into booming producer and consumer economies. Other countries
are slowly incorporating these two models into their own economies to recreate the
success stories. Militarily, Brazil and Argentina have strong weapons industries and
have demonstrated the ability to pursue nuclear weapons. Although a nuclear
weapons free zone has been informally established in Latin America (Treaty of
Tlatelolco) Brazil's intentions to formally ratify the treaty are suspect. Recently, Brazil
has actively pursued development of a nuclear-powered submarine and other nuclear
power technology that could be converted easily to nuclear weapons.
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outcomes that would drastically change the Amazonian situation with respect
to U.S. objectives. Consequently, the U.S. would not have to expend
diplomatic and fiscal resources in an attempt to influence Brazil. Given the
recent apprehension between Brazilian and U.S. diplomats, the neglect option
also has the advantage of shielding !he U.S. from Latin American accusations
of "interventionism," as this policy advocates letting each country pursue its
objectives unhindered.
While the neglect policy would produce the least amount of tension
between the two countries, it would not be very effective with regards to
achieving U.S. objectives. Even if Brazil expands the Calha Norte project to
support counterdrug objectives, the country does not possess the resources to
institute an effective campaign against the narco-traffickers. Therefore, U.S.
resources and expertise could assist the Brazilians in mounting this campaign.
Under this option the U.S. is also not likely to realize its environmental
objectives. This is due to the fact that Brazil's environmental policies are
unlikely to change without external pressures (see above: Environmental
Impact of Calha Norte).
Indirect Support
Since the early 1980's relations between the United States and Brazil
have deteriorated because Brazil thinks the United States has blocked its path
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to "first world" status. Brazil views itself as engaged in a "patron-client"
relationship with the United States and characterizes that relationship as the
obstacle that prevents its progress towards modernization. In the past,
Brazilian nationalism has hampered U.S. attempts at diplomacy within the
region. The current situation does not look much brighter for U.S. policies vis-
a-vis Brazil.
International diplomacy might provide a solution to overcome this barrier
and allow a functional policy to evolve in Brazil. This option would involve
the United States' coordination of Brazilian policies through multilateral rather
than bilateral channels. The multilateral relationship could be achieved
through organizations such as the Organization of American States (OAS) or
the United Nations. The success of such a relationship with Brazil has been
proved in the past as illustrated in regards to illegal mining operations in the
Amazon. Brazil's original attempts to expel the renegade miners from the
Amazon were initiated only after intense pressure by governmental and
nongovernmental actors from the international arena. The OAS option is
particularly attractive given that the policy prescriptions would be coming
from Brazil's Latin American peers rather than the United States or Europe.
This policy option does not suggest that all direct relations between the
U.S. and Brazil be severed in favor of multilateral relations. On the contrary,
relations such as military and trade should remain bilateral to better enhance
regard for the United States within Brazil. When the United States tries to
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shape or affect Brazilian domestic policy, however, the international diplomacy
option would have the best chamce of success.
Direct Support
Direct diplomacy would require the United States to work directly with
Brazil in promulgating U.S. policy. As mentioned above, this option runs a
great risk of being viewed by Brazil as another attempt by the U.S. to
intervene in Brazilian domestic affairs. As such, Brazil would disregard any
goals or objectives put forth by the U.S. under this type of policy. The "direct"
option would fuel Brazilian nationalism and defeat any hope for a successful
U.S. policy vis-a-vis Brazil. Under the current political conditions within
Brazil, the U.S. should refrain from adopting this type of policy.
Recommendations
Previously, a conflict with Argentina dominated Brazilian security
concerns. However, given that Brazilian-Argentine relations have drastically
improved, this threat seems to have subsided. Replacing this threat has been
the narco-trafficking trade presently growing in the Brazilian Amazon. For
years the United States has attempted to convince the Brazilian military to
adopt a counterdrug mission. The Brazilian military has refused on the
grounds that they are not prepared for the mission. They cite lack of funds
and personnel training as reasons for avoiding the task. More importantly,
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though, Brazil sees U.S. demands as an act of interventionism that affronts
Brazilian sovereignty. The present Brazilian counterdrug mission, which is
currently headed by the Federal Police (PF), has been ineffective, lacking
sufficient manning to adequately patrol the country's borders and jungle
region. The PF is responsible for providing for providing counter-narcotics
coverage for all of Brazil, yet is only comprised of 6,000 personnel. The PF
Director General, Amauri Gaudino, stated that the PF should have a minimum
of 25,000 members to perform their function adequately.153
Brazil understands the threat that narcotics imposes, but economic reality
dictates that resources are not available to expand the PF as Gaudino
recommends. However, given the regional situation, the Calha Norte project,
which also currently lacks both personnel and resources to mount a
counterdrug offensive, could provide a solution to Brazil's narcotics problems.
Since Argentina no longer poses a valid threat to Brazil, the military could
expand the Calha Norte project by transfering Southern Command assets to
the CMA. This could be done with little to no added cost to the government.
These additional resources would enhance Calha Norte's counterdrug abilities,
and result in a relatively small impact on the military's operating budget. A
U.S. policy in favor of such an initiative would not be viewed as
interventionist as it would be complementary to Brazilian conceived goals.
'
53
"Drug Trafficking Rise Blamed on Police Crisis," Ere (Madrid), in Spanish, 0149
GMT, 19 February 1993, translated in FBIS, LAT-93-034, 23 February 1993, 22.
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This effort would make a Brazilian counterdrug mission more palatable and
more effective.
Given these arguments, it is this author's opinion that the United States
should support an expansion of the Calha Norte project through a policy of
indirect support. This will allow the necessary resources and technologies to
be made available to Brazil such that the project may become an effective
counterdrug vehicle while avoiding the potential frictions of a direct support
policy.
While this thesis recommends a policy supporting an augmentation of the
Calha Norte project, it does not favor a policy of unrestricted expansion. An
increased Brazilian Army presence in the Amazon by itself will do nothing to
change the situation either. Brazil's past history suggests that the increased
Brazilian presence would simrly result in more soldiers standing idly by,
observing the abuse of the indigenous population. In order to protect
international environmental interests in the Amazon, the United States must
couple support for the Calha Norte project with demands for stronger Indian
policies and mining regulations from the Brazilian government.
Critics further worry that the expansion of Calha Norte could result in a
state within a state, increasing the political leverage of the military within
society. The business interests and population of the Amazon would owe their
livelihood and their allegiance to the military for its development of the region.
While it remains a possibility, the likelihood of Calha Norte encouraging an
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increased political role for the military is remote. This was illustrated during
the 1992 crisis over the Fernando Collor de Mello administration, where the
military took great pains to distance itself from a sticky political situation.
Public statements by active and retired military officials indicated that they
wanted this matter to be handled solely by the civilian government. The
military clearly indicated that they desired to avoid the same politicized role in
the government that they enjoyed eight years ago during the military
administration. Thus, an expansion of the Calha Norte program does not seem
to endanger democracy and civilian rule at this juncture. However, to further
insure that the civilian institutions do not suffer from an expanded Calha
Norte project, all U.S. diplomatic action, no matter which option is employed,
should be made through Itamaraty. By empowering the civilian institutions




The introduction raised a number of important issues, such as: (1) Brazil's
rationale for occupation of the Amazon; (2) security implications of the Calha
Norte project with regards to regional and international interests; and (3) policy
options for the United States vis-a-vis Brazil and the Calha Norte project. This
section will summarize the findings of the paper and provide recommendations
for further research.
A. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
In 1985, the Calha Norte project was authorized by the Brazilian government
to achieve geopolitical goals and secure the Amazon. However, since 1985, the
military's rationale for the Calha Norte project has expanded. The project still
provides a vehicle for the Army to achieve the geopolitical goals of economically
harnessing the Amazon and establishing a military and security presence in the
region. In addition, changing economic and political situations within Brazil have
encouraged the military to use the project for more than geopolitical purposes.
The shrinking military budget and changing international threats have caused the
military leadership to justify itself in areas where it had previously enjoyed
autonomy. This has led to a redefinition of the Calha Norte project as more than
an operation to achieve geopolitical ends for the country, but also as one that
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satisfies the country's need for national development. By portraying the project
as one of necessary civic action, the military is able to rationalize and defend its
budget before the Brazilian general public. Further, the project serves to
substitute the protection and development of the Brazilian Amazon as the Army's
mission for that of defender against the disappearing threats of Soviet
communism and Argentine hostilities. Consequently, as the military's rationale
for the project has grown, so to have the resources that they have invested in the
project.
The growth of the Calha Norte project has had the potential to affect both
regional and international security interests. Regionally, the military buildup of
Calha Norte has not had the anticipated affect of heightening local tensions. In
fact, with the exception of Venezuela, Calha Norte has strengthened bilateral
relations as it pursues goals common to Brazil's neighbors. The case of Venezuela
stands out because of the excessive illegal mining activity occurring on the border
regions between the two countries. Although the project is not directly
responsible for the presence of the miners, the infrastructure introduced to the
region by Calha Norte has served to encourage mining operations in the Amazon.
This problem must be seriously and carefully addressed by Brazil, because
ignoring the problem will only allow the miners to extend their operations into
other countries. This will almost certainly reproduce the tensions of the
Venezuelan-Brazilian relationship within other countries of the Amazon region.
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Lastly, the United States should take advantage of the opportunity that the
Calha Norte project presents to advance U.S. goals within the region. The project
represents the Brazilian Army's first real attempt to mount a counterdrug
campaign in the Amazon region. Although critics postulate that the military
project threatens the environment and indigenous populations, Calha Norte has
had only a small effect on these two issues. The real danger to the environment
is posed by the mining operations present in the Amazon and the official
Brazilian mining policies under which they operate. Thus, even if the Army were
to withdraw from the region, this action would not necessarily cause the miners
to leave as well. The end result would be the continued imperilment of the
Amazon's resources and population.
Ironically, one of Calha Norte's objectives is to curtail the harmful wildcat
mining operations and secure the safety of the Amazon's indigenous population.
For the most part, forces have been ineffectual in achieving these objectives.
However, the Army has proven its capability to fulfill these objectives when
motivated to do so. In the past, this motivation has taken the form of domestic
and international pressure exerted by government and environmental
organizations. A removal or reduction of the Army's presence in the region
would result in the loss of this tool to combat the current environmental
destruction.
The United States must be careful how it encourages Brazil, as Brazil is very
sensitive about its sovereignty in relation to the Amazon. If Brazil senses that the
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U.S.-Brazil relationship is to be one of a "patron-client", Brazil will be less likely
to respond to U.S. overtures.
The United States has three policy options that it could use to encourage the
Calha Norte project: benign neglect, indirect support, and direct support. The
benign neglect option assumes that Brazil will expand the project on its own
without encouragement, and therefore advocates a laissez-faire policy on the part
of the United States. The indirect support option advocates that the U.S.
encourage the Calha Norte using international organizations such as the OAS.
Finally, the direct support option recommends the United States work directly
with Brazil to encourage the project.
The thesis recommends that the United States adopt the indirect support
policy option and work through international organizations. This policy option
would have a greater chance of success as it provides encouragement for the
project while avoiding being criticized for interventionism. To support
strengthening of democratic institutions, these organizations for U.S. policy should
funnel all contacts made in Brazil through Itamaraty, a civilian institution.
B. AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
This paper has illustrated an expanding rationale for the Calha Norte
program. The expanded rationale has coincided with an expanded Army presence
in the Amazon, raising issues that require further research. First, there is a need
to determine how the Calha Norte project can best focus its resources to combat
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narco-trafficking. Even with the expanded resources planned for the project
combined with those recommended by this paper, the Army is not set up to
combat narco-trafficking. Additional training and organization is required to
accomplish this task.
Second, an expanded Calha Norte project has the potential to work to
protect the environment if it is supported by sound policy in Brasflia, Further
research is needed to develop policies that can work to complement the military
presence in the Amazon to achieve environmental goals.
Third, the project claims to promote the development of the region.
Additional research should focus on the actual operation of the frontier posts, and
whether or not this model of development will be successful for the Amazon
region.
Lastly, civilian involvement within Calha Norte has been virtually
abandoned. Further research should be performed to determine whether and
where civilian responsibilities should be reinstated in the project.
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